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BRASWELL v. UNITED STATES: AN EXAMINATION OF A
CUSTODIAN'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO AVOID
PERSONAL PRODUCTION OF CORPORATE
RECORDS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the early part of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court denied corporations a fifth amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination relating to their corporate records.' The Court later denied unincorporated business entities a fifth amendment privilege as
2
well. This treatment became known as the "collective entity doctrine."
In order to give effect to the collective entity doctrine and prevent these
entities from enjoying a derivative fifth amendment privilege, 3 the Court
also denied the custodian of corporate records a fifth amendment privilege in the documents. 4 Known as the "representative capacity doctrine," this approach denies a custodian a privilege in the entity's
records no matter how personally incriminating the records may be. 5
However, in developing both the collective entity and the representative
capacity doctrines, the Court was concerned solely with the contents of
the subpoenaed records. 6 As a result, the Court refused to recognize a
custodian's claim of fifth amendment protection because if the custodian
could claim a privilege in the contents of subpoenaed records, the gov1. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1905). "No person shall be ...compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .. " U.S. CoNsT.
amend. V. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases which have denied a fifth
amendment privilege to corporations, see infra notes 36-43 and accompanying
text.
2. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 704 (1944). For a discussion of the
collective entity doctrine and of what constitutes a "collective entity," see infra
notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
3. A derivative fifth amendment privilege would occur if a corporation or
collective entity received the benefit of the custodian's personal fifth amendment
privilege. For a further discussion of this concept, see infra notes 68-72 and
accompanying text.
4. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1973) (custodian of corporate records has no fifth amendment privilege in records' contents); White, 322
U.S. at 698 (custodian of collective entity's records has no fifth amendment privilege in their contents); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 385 (1911)
(same).
5. See White, 322 U.S. at 699 (papers and records of collective entity cannot
be subject of custodian's personal privilege even though records may incriminate him personally); Wilson, 221 U.S. at 385 (state can compel production of
records without regard to how incriminating they are).

6. For a discussion of the focus of the representative capacity doctrine, see
infra notes 66-91 and accompanying text.

(353)
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7
ernment could never obtain them.

Recently, however, the Court developed a new approach to fifth
amendment claims concerning documents. Known as the "act of production doctrine," this approach stripped the contents of records of
their previously privileged status and shifted the Court's attention from
the contents of the records to the physical act of producing them. 8 This
approach focuses on whether the actual act of producing subpoenaed
records violates the fifth amendment. 9 In contrast to the traditional assertion of a privilege in the contents of records, recognizing a custodian's claim of privilege with respect to the act of producing the
documents does not prevent the government from obtaining the subpoenaed records.' 0 However, the Court only developed the act of production analysis in the context of an individual's papers and
documents.' I Therefore, it did not address whether a collective entity's
7. See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 379-80. The Court stated that if a custodian had a
privilege in the record's contents then the
power of the courts to require their production depends ... upon the
particular custody in which they are found. If they are found in the
actual custody of an officer whose criminal conduct they would disclose,
then.., his possession must be deemed inviolable .... [Therefore,] he
may ... assert against the visitorial power of the State, and the authority of the Government in enforcing its laws, an impassable barrier.
Id. at 379. The corporation could then avoid inspection of its books by the simple expedient of placing them in the possession of someone who would be incriminated by their contents.
8. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984) (contents of voluntarily prepared records not privileged, but act of producing the documents may
be); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (custodian cannot avoid
compliance with subpoena by asserting records containing incriminating writing, but act of production raises fifth amendment issues wholly aside from contents of papers produced). For a further discussion of the act of production
doctrine, see infra notes 105-46 and accompanying text.
9. In responding to a subpoena, a custodian "tacitly concedes the existence
of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the [custodian]. It
also would indicate the [custodian's] belief that the papers [produced] are those
described in the subpoena." Doe, 465 U.S. at 613 (quoting Curcio v. United
States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957)). Depending upon the circumstances of the
particular case, these admissions may constitute self-incrimination. Id. For a
further discussion of the possible incriminating aspects of these admissions, see
infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
10. See Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 2294 (1988). By addressing the subpoena to the corporation, the government ensures compliance with
the subpoena because the corporation "must find some means by which to comply." Id. Because the contents are not privileged, the only fifth amendment defense a custodian can raise is that the act of producing the documents is
incriminating. His claim is, in essence, that he cannot produce the records, not
that another employee of the corporation cannot produce them. For a further
discussion of this concept, see infra notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
11. See Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (government subpoenaed records of sole proprietorships owned by respondent); Fisher, 425 U.S. 391 (government subpoenaed
taxpayer's records in course of tax fraud investigation).
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custodian could claim the act of production privilege. 12 After the development of the act of production doctrine, the circuits split as to whether
a custodian of corporate records could avail himself of this new privilege. 13 In Braswell v. United States, 14 the Supreme Court held that the
5
custodian could not.'
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Boyd v. United States: The Genesis of the Fifth Amendment

Application to Documents
The fifth amendment protection granted to business records
originated in Boyd v. United States. 16 In Boyd, the government subpoenaed partners to produce an invoice concerning the previous purchase
of twenty-nine cases of glass.1 7 The invoice was produced over Boyd's
8
objection that the subpoena violated his fifth amendment rights.'
In accepting Boyd's argument, the Court found that the fifth
12. For a discussion of the interrelation of the act of production doctrine
and the representative capacity doctrine, see infra notes 203-88 and accompanying text.
13. Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143 (6th
Cir.) (en banc) (denying custodian's act of production privilege), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1033 (1985) and United States v. Malis, 737 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1984)
(same) with In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (recognizing custodian's act of production claim) and In re Grand Jury No.
86-3 (Will Roberts Corp.), 816 F.2d 569 (11 th Cir. 1987) (same). For a discussion of the circuit split and the Supreme Court's resolution of the issue, see infra
notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
14. 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988). For the facts of Braswell, see infra notes 153-60
and accompanying text.
15. 108 S. Ct. at 2287 (custodian has no act of production privilege under
fifth amendment).
16. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd has since been overruled sub silencio by the
cases detailed in this Note. Although the Supreme Court occasionally refers to
Boyd as retaining some vitality, it has no significance in the context of business
records. At this time it is unclear whether Boyd still offers protection to the private records of individuals. For a discussion of Boyd's significance in the context
of private records, see infra note 120. This Note discusses Boyd merely as a preface for later developments in the business records area.
17. 116 U.S. at 618. The government brought a suit to compel the forfeiture of several cases of glass that were allegedly illegally imported. Id.
18. Id. Boyd also objected to the subpoena on fourth amendment grounds,
claiming the subpoena constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at
621. The Court found that both amendments were violated by the subpoena.
Id. at 638. The Court stated that the two amendments protected the same rights
of "personal security, personal liberty and private property .... ." Id. at 630.
The Court held that a subpoena compelling the production of private property
for use in a criminal proceeding violated the fifth amendment. Id. See also Heidt,
The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents-CuttingFisher's Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L.
REV. 439, 446 (1984). The Court went on to hold that the fourth amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated as a result
of the fifth amendment violation. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 446-47. This Note will only
examine the Court's treatment of the fifth amendment issue.
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amendment protected the rights of "personal security, personal liberty
and private property."1 9 The Court concluded that compelling a person
to produce his own private documents was not "substantially different
from compelling him to be a witness against himself within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment." 20° Thus, a subpoena 2compelling production
of private records violated the fifth amendment. '
The Court's extension of fifth amendment protection to documents
22
turned on whether the individual owned the subpoenaed documents.
The Court held that compelling the production of privately owned papers amounted to a trespass which violated the fifth amendment. 3 In
focusing on the ownership of the documents, the Court effectively constructed a protected zone around the contents of the records into which
24
the government could not intrude.
This property-based holding created problems in the investigation
and punishment of business-related crime.2 5 Because most white collar
crime leaves only a "paper trail," law enforcement agencies require access to business records. 2 6 Economic crimes are often sophisticated,
complex transactions usually originating in the remote past and extending over a long period of time. 2 7 Because this type of crime rarely
leaves anything but documentary evidence, the records of the business
are vital to the detection of the crime. 28 Without access to these
19. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. The thrust of the Court's opinion was that the
fifth amendment protected the private property of an accused from governmental intrusion. See Heidt, supra note 18, at 445.
20. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633.
21. Id. at 638.
22. See Heidt, supra note 18, at 446 (although Court referred to "private
papers," it meant documents which were private property of person claiming
privilege); Comment, Fifth Amendment Protection and the Productionof Corporate Docu-

ments, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 747, 750 (1987) (Boyd's invoice could not be subpoenaed because it was his private property).
23. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627-28. See also Heidt, supra note 18, at 445 (Court
held that compelling partners to submit to subpoena amounted to trespass on
their property). The Court stated that an extremely important purpose of society was to ensure the safety of a person's property. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627-28.
Governmental interference with property rights abridged one's right to property
and therefore constituted a trespass. Heidt, supra note 18, at 445.
24. Note, The Fifth Amendment and Production of Documents After United States

v. Doe, 66 B.U.L. REV. 95, 100 (1986) (Court used fifth amendment to construct
zone of privacy around records in order to protect sanctity of home and privacies of life).
25. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1905) (if corporation could refuse to
produce books, result would be failure of large number of cases).
26. Wilson & Matz, Obtaining Evidence For FederalEconomic Crime Prosecutions:
An Overview and Analysis of Investigative Methods, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 651, 651

(1977) (prosecuting economic crimes requires sifting through roomfuls of obscure documents).
27. Id.
28. Id. See also Note, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1276 (1979) (because prohibited con-
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records, extreme difficulty exists in even determining whether a crime
was committed. 29 If courts mechanically applied the Boyd doctrine to
deny governmental access to documents owned by business entities,
regulation of business activity would be impossible. 30 It was this concern which drove the Court to develop measures calculated to avert the
31
consequences of Boyd.
B.

The Development of the Collective Entity Doctrine

In response to the problem posed by Boyd, the Supreme Court developed the collective entity doctrine, which denied fifth amendment
protection to the records of collective entities.3 2 In order to give effect
to this doctrine, the Court denied the collective entity's custodian of
records a fifth amendment privilege in the records as well. 33 The
Court's development of the collective entity exception occurred in two
distinct steps. First, the Court denied corporations a fifth amendment
privilege. 34 Later, it denied a fifth amendment privilege to other unin35
corporated business entities.
1.

The Corporate Records Exception
The Court first considered the problem presented by the broad

duct often leaves no physical evidence, documents may provide only evidence
that crime was committed).
29. Hale, 201 U.S. at 74 (absence of records would result in failure of large
number of cases where illegal conduct only is determinable upon examination of
such records). See also Wilson & Matz, supra note 26, at 651 (because proof of
economic crimes consists mainly of documents, government must resolve
threshold question of whether crime was in fact committed).
30. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1943) (if fifth amendment
privilege were accorded to business records, effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would be impossible).
31. Hale, 201 U.S. at 74 (refusal of production of records on grounds that
corporation was incriminated by their contents would result in failure of large
number of cases where government could determine illegal conduct only

through examination of records).
32. White, 322 U.S. at 700. The Court reasoned that the nature and scope
of economic activities of both incorporated and unincorporated entities demanded that the government's power to regulate those activities be equally
great. Id. Therefore, the Court denied these collective entities a fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 701.
33. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1973) (recognizing custodian's
fifth amendment claim in records would frustrate governmental regulation of
collective entities); White, 322 U.S. at 699 (custodian, when acting as representative of collective entity, assumes privileges and duties of collective entity; because collective entity has no fifth amendment privilege, custodian has none);
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 385 (1911) (custodian has no personal
fifth amendment privilege in corporate books).
34. For a further discussion of the Court's denial of a fifth amendment privilege to corporations, see infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
35. For a further discussion of the Court's denial of a fifth amendment privilege to unincorporated entities, see infra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.
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Boyd holding in the context of a governmental investigation into possible corporate wrongdoing. The Court in Hale v. Henke136 established
that a corporation could not under any circumstances claim a fifth
amendment privilege with respect to corporate records. 3 7 The Court
reasoned that the fifth amendment privilege was a purely personal one
38
and that a corporation, as a "creature of the State," could not assert it.
The Court based its "creature of the State" rationale upon the notion
that the state of incorporation grants certain privileges and franchises
which the corporation retains "subject to the laws of the State and the
limitations of its charter."' 39 According to Hale, the state allows a corporation to exist provided it does not violate the "laws of its creation" or
abuse the privileges and franchises granted by the state. 40 Therefore, in
order to ensure that a corporation obeys the state's laws and its own
charter, the Court held that the state necessarily reserves a right to inspect the corporation's records to discover any wrongdoing. 4' As the
Court stated, "[i]t would be a strange anomaly to hold that a State, having chartered a corporation . . .could not . . .[determine whether the

powers granted to the corporation] had been abused, and demand the
42
production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose."
Therefore, a corporation could not defeat the state's visitorial power by
43
claiming a fifth amendment privilege with respect to its records.
36. 201 U.S. 43 (1905). In Hale, the government subpoenaed Hale to produce corporate documents relevant to an investigation into possible antitrust
law violations. Id. at 44-46. Hale refused to comply, asserting the contents of
the records would tend to incriminate the corporation and him personally. Id. at

46. The government granted Hale immunity from prosecution, thus vitiating
any self-incrimination claim he might have had. Id. at 66-70. As a result, the
Court reached only the issue of the corporation's fifth amendment privilege. Id.
at 70-75.
37. Id. at 75-76. The Court held that a corporation did not have a fifth
amendment privilege to refuse production of its books, and also more broadly
that a corporation had no fifth amendment privilege relating to any type of information. Id. at 75. See also Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege For ProducingCorporate
Documents, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1544, 1547 (1986) (Hale Court limited fifth amendment privilege to protecting only natural persons from self-incrimination,
thereby excluding corporations from protection).
38. Hale, 201 U.S. at 74-75 (corporation, as creature of state, may not lawfully refuse to produce books). See also Note, supra note 24, at 102 (corporation
could not invoke fifth amendment because privilege is designed to protect
individual).
39. Hale, 201 U.S. at 74-75.
40. Id.at 75.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The Hale Court went on to state why the federal government retains
visitorial powers over corporations even though they are not incorporated under
federal law. Because franchises granted by the state of incorporation involve
questions of interstate commerce, the Court asserted that these franchises "must
also be exercised in subordination to the power of Congress to regulate such
commerce, and in respect to this the General Government may also assert a
sovereign authority to ascertain whether such franchises have been exercised in
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The Collective Entity Doctrine

Thus, Hale settled the fifth amendment question with regard to corporations. However, the possibility that Boyd could be used to prevent
government access to business documents still existed in regard to other
unincorporated business entities. Corporations, although a major feature in the business landscape, 4 4 certainly are not responsible for all
white-collar crimes. The Court confronted this reality and developed
the collective entity doctrine which expanded the corporate records ex45
ception to include other types of business entities.
The Court faced a major theoretical obstacle to expanding the corporate records exception to encompass entities other than corporations.
In United States v. White, 4 6 the Court recognized that because unincorporated entities such as labor unions and partnerships were not granted
special privileges and franchises, the state could not reserve visitorial
powers in return. 4 7 To circumvent this problem, the White Court abandoned reliance on the "creature of the state" rationale and instead relied upon the "inherent and necessary power of ... governments to
enforce their laws ....
48 To reach this conclusion the Court confronted what it saw as the realities of the modern business world. Recognizing that unincorporated organizations accounted for much of
modern economic activity, the White Court stated that federal and state
authorities needed to regulate these organizations. 4 9 Without access to
a lawful manner ...." Id. Therefore, the visitorial powers of the federal government "are the same as if the corporation had been created by an act of Congress." Id.
44. As early as 1905, the Court recognized that corporations had become
"a necessary feature of modern business activity, and their aggregated capital
has become the source of nearly all great enterprises." Id. at 76.
45. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1973) (unincorporated entities
have no fifth amendment privilege if they are "collective entities"); United States
v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944) (same).
46. 322 U.S. 694 (1944). In White the government was conducting an investigation into alleged irregularities in the construction of the Mechanicsburg Naval Supply Depot. Id. at 695. A subpoena duces tecum was issued to Local No.
542 of the International Union of Operating Engineers requiring the union to
produce relevant records. Id. White, the union official with possession of the
records, appeared before the grand jury and refused to comply with the subpoena on the grounds that compliance would tend to incriminate both the union

and White personally. Id. at 695-96.
47. Id. at 700. See also Note, Sole Shareholder's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination In Producing Corporate Documents-In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 59 TEMP.
L.Q. 219, 228 (1986) (Court recognized that reserved powers of visitation rationale was absent in White because union was not chartered by state).
48. White, 322 U.S. at 701 (state chartering of corporations provides convenient justification for governmental inspection of corporate books, but fact that
organization is unincorporated does not lessen necessity for regulation of its
activity).
49. Id. at 700-01. The Court found that the "scope and nature of the economic activities of incorporated and unincorporated organizations and their
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organizational records, any regulation would be effectively impossible. 50
Therefore, White held that the power to compel production of records of
incorporated and unincorporated entities arises from the government's
necessary power to enforce business-related laws and regulations. 5 1
The White Court thus limited the fifth amendment to "its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimi'5 2
nation through his own testimony or personal records."
However, some unincorporated business entities, such as sole proprietorships, are so personally linked to the individual owner that in
subpoenaing their business records the government is actually compelling production of an individual's personal records. 53 The Court
wanted to exempt these small, individually-run organizations from the
compelled production of business records. Thus, it held that only "collective entities" are subject to mandatory production of possibly incriminating business records. 54 The White Court "defined" a collective entity
as a business organization which "one can fairly say under all the circumstances ... has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to ... represent the purely

private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody
'55
their common or group interests only."
The Court's conception of a collective entity as defined in White is
an elusive concept. Therefore, in Bellis v. United States,5 6 the Court noted
representatives demand that the constitutional power of federal and state governments to regulate those activities be correspondingly effective." Id.at 700.
50. Id. (without access to records and documents, effective enforcement of
federal and state laws impossible). For a further discussion of the difficulty of
regulating organizations without access to business records, see supra notes 2530 and accompanying text.
51. 322 U.S. at 700-01.

52. Id. at 701. Because the federal and state governments had the inherent
power to enforce their laws, and because the fifth amendment was limited to
protecting only the natural person, the unincorporated status of the union did
not bar enforcement of the government's subpoena. Id. at 700-01.
53. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1973) (fifth amendment protection against compulsion of private papers applies to business records of sole
proprietors or sole practitioners).
54. White, 322 U.S. at 701 (if organization represents collective interests of
its members, fifth amendment privilege cannot be invoked on behalf of organi-

zation). Cf Bellis, 417 U.S. at 88 (collective entities cannot assert fifth amendment privilege).
55. White, 322 U.S. at 701. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize this abstract proposition is to view a business which solely advances the interests of its
sole proprietor as nothing more than the proprietor's alter-ego. However, a collective entity is one that represents the collective interests of its members or has
an identity independent of its members and is treated as a separate "person,"
wholly distinct from its membership. For a discussion of why these collective
entities are denied a fifth amendment privilege, see supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
56. 417 U.S. 85 (1973). In Bellis, the defendant had been a senior partner
in a Philadelphia law firm. Id. at 86. The firm had only three partners and two
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its dissatisfaction with the White formulation and endeavored to articu57
late this concept with an eye toward greater certainty in its application.
In holding that a three-person law partnership was a collective entity,
the Court stated that the determination of what is or is not a collective
entity cannot "be reduced to a simple proposition based solely upon the
size of the organization." ' 58 Instead, the Court held that the organization must have an identity separate from its individual members. Significant facts to be taken into account when making this determination are
the formality of the creation of the entity, 5 9 length of its existence, 60 its
organizational structure, 6 1 and any evidence that the organization held
'6 2
itself out as an "entity with an independent institutional identity."
Although the Bellis Court's elaboration on the White formulation is
hardly a paragon of certainty, the Court had no problem determining
that a labor union 63 and a small three-person law partnership 64 both
qualified as collective entities.
Contemporaneously, the Court confronted the issue of whether a
custodian of records could assert a fifth amendment privilege in the
records. 6 5 As opposed to a collective entity, custodians are natural persons. Thus, they can invoke the fifth amendment in appropriate circumassociates. Id. The defendant left the firm in 1969 and thereafter the firm was
dissolved. Id. In early 1973, the defendant had the firm's records removed to
his new law offices. Id. Later that year, the defendant was served with a subpoena directing him to appear before a grand jury with the partnership records
for 1968 and 1969. Id. The defendant refused, asserting his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Id. The defendant argued that under the
White formulation, the firm was too small to constitute a collective entity. Id. at
95-96. Therefore, the records were not held in a representative capacity and
thus were not subject to production. Id. at 96.
57. Id. at 100-01 (Court noted that it is difficult to know precisely which
entities fit within White formulation).

58. Id. at 100.
59. Id. at 95.
60. Id. at 95-96.
61. Id. at 96.
62. Id. at 97.
63. White, 322 U.S. at 701. For a discussion of the facts of White, see supra
note 46.
64. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 95. Although the Court's definition of a collective
entity is very broad and seemingly applies to practically any business, it does
have limits. The entity "must be relatively well organized and structured, and
not merely a loose, informal association of individuals." Id. at 92-93. This analysis presupposes that more than one individual owns the entity. If the entity is a
sole proprietorship, afortiori the entity cannot represent the collective interest of
its members. However, based upon the Court's finding that a three-member
partnership is a collective entity, it is likely that these sole proprietorships are
the only entities excluded from this doctrine.
65. The Court first addressed the issue of a corporate custodian's possible
privilege in business records in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
For the facts of Wilson, see infra note 69. The Court then addressed the identical
issue in the context of a collective entity's custodian in both Whie and Bellis.
Each case involved the claims of custodians on behalf of both themselves and the
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stances. In holding that a custodian has neither a fifth amendment
privilege in the contents of corporate records, nor in those of a collective entity, the Court developed what has come to be known as the representative capacity doctrine.
3.

The Representative Capacity Doctrine

The Court's first treatment of a custodian's possible fifth amendment privilege in business records occurred during the development of
the corporate records exception. 6 6 By this time, the Court had established that a corporation could not claim a fifth amendment privilege
because it is not a natural person. Yet, this did not resolve whether a
custodian of the corporate records, a natural person, could claim the
67
privilege if the records would tend to incriminate him personally.
However, the issue of a custodian's possible fifth amendment privilege
in corporate records presented problems identical to those raised in the
context of a possible corporate privilege. 68 The Court in Wilson v. United
States6 9 recognized that approval of a custodian's claim with respect to
corporate records would effectively prevent the government from inspecting these documents. 70 Therefore, the state's visitorial power over
the corporate records could be defeated merely by placing the records
in the possession of an officer who would be incriminated by the record's contents. 7 ' Such a result would effectively eviscerate the corporate records exception to the Boyd doctrine since a corporation would
entity. For the facts and holding of White, see supra note 46. For the facts and
holding of Bellis, see supra note 56.
66. See Wilson, 221 U.S. 361.
67. In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1905), the custodian of the records had
been granted immunity from prosecution so he could not assert his own fifth
amendment claim. Id. at 67-68. The Court held that because Hale was not ex-

posed to a possible federal criminal charge, the fifth amendment was inapplicable. Id. at 67. Thus the Court did not consider whether a custodian had a fifth

amendment privilege.
68. If a custodian of corporate records could assert a personal privilege in
the records, the government would be denied access to inspect the documents.
As a result, corporations would take the simple step of putting the records in the
possession of a person who would be incriminated by the contents. Therefore,
the detection and punishment of corporate crime would be as difficult as if a
corporation itself could assert a fifth amendment claim.
69. 221 U.S. 361 (1911). In Wilson the government was investigating
charges of fraudulent use of the mails. Id. at 367. The government directed a
subpoena to the United Wireless Telegraph Company and to Wilson, who was
president and custodian of records. Id. at 367-68. Wilson refused to deliver the
records to the government, arguing that the contents would tend to incriminate
him. Id. at 369.
70. Id. at 384-85 (if corporate officers could refuse inspection of organization's records, state's reserved power of visitation would be "seriously embarrassed if not wholly defeated"). See also Note, supra note 24, at 103 (if corporate
officers could refuse inspection of corporate records, these records would be
effectively shielded from governmental inspection).

71. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 384-85.
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receive a derivative fifth amendment privilege from the custodian.
In order to avert this possibility, the Wilson Court held that a custodian could never assert his own personal privilege with regard to the
contents of corporate documents. 73 In support of its holding, the Court
74
emphasized the corporation's superior property rights in the records.
Because the corporation, and not the custodian, owned the documents,
75
the custodian had no basis on which to assert his personal privilege.
This analysis was merely a mechanical application of the Boyd doctrine
which required ownership of the subpoenaed documents in order to assert a fifth amendment privilege. 76 Because the custodian could assert
only a possessory interest and not an ownership interest in the records,
the Court found he could not assert his own personal fifth amendment
privilege in the corporation's documents. 77 The Court's holding in Wilson provided the first basis on which the representative capacity would
ultimately rest: the prevention of a corporation's enjoyment of a fifth
amendment privilege derived from its custodian.
The Court's expansion of the corporate records exception to include other unincorporated entities created problems in Wilson's ownership interest analysis of a custodian's fifth amendment claim. Because
custodians of a union or partnership do have an ownership interest in
the records, as well a possessory interest, the Boyd doctrine could be
applied to prevent production. 78 However, in analyzing a custodian's
fifth amendment claim, the Court in White began by holding that individ-

72. The corporation would receive a "derivative privilege" because the custodian could prevent inspection of the records through his own privilege.
Therefore, the exercise of the custodian's privilege by the corporation would
shield the corporation from investigations. Thus, a corporation would enjoy the
protections and benefits of the custodian's privilege. In effect, the corporation
would receive a privilege even though it was not entitled to one. Id.

73. Id. The Court stated that although the government could not compel a
custodian to orally testify, the government's visitorial power "with respect to the
corporation of necessity reaches the corporate books without regard to the conduct of the custodian." Id. at 385.

74. Id. The Court noted that as president and custodian of the corporate
records, Wilson was "subject to its [the corporation's] direction ....
took his place his custody [of the records] would yield." Id.

If another

75. Id. The Court held that Wilson "could assert no personal right to retain the corporate books against any demand of [the] government which the corporation was bound to recognize" because he had no personal property right in
the records. Id.
76. Comment, The Right Against Self-Incrimination by Producing Documents: Rethinking the Representative Capacity Doctrine, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1605, 1611 (1986)
(Court's focus on corporation's superior property rights was consistent with
property-rights approach taken in Boyd).
77. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 385.
78. This assumes, of course, that the custodian is also a member of the entity. For a discussion of the Boyd doctrine, see supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text. The defendant in White successfully made this proprietary interest
argument in the circuit court. White, 322 U.S. at 696-97. The court ruled that

the records were the property of all the union's members and therefore the de-
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uals, when acting as representatives of a collective entity, can neither
exercise their "personal rights and duties nor be entitled to their purely
personal privileges." 79 Rather, the individual assumes the duties and
privileges of the entity which he represents. 80 Therefore, if a custodian
is holding the entity's records in his representative capacity, the custodian has no personal privilege in the records and instead assumes the
entity's privileges and obligations. If the entity has no privilege in the
records, the custodian has none as well. 8 ' The Court, in effect, repudiated the Boyd analysis in which the applicability of the fifth amendment
turned on the type of interest the custodian had in the records. 8 2 Instead, this new analysis made the applicability of the fifth amendment
contingent on the capacity in which the custodian holds the records.8 3
A problem arises, however, in determining whether a custodian is
holding the records in a representative or personal capacity. The Court
resolved this issue by looking to the second policy underlying the representative capacity doctrine, which is to limit the fifth amendment to the
protection of an individual's privacy.8 4 If a custodian can assert a substantial privacy interest in the records, then he holds them in a personal
capacity and thus cannot be forced to produce them.8 5 Therefore, to
determine if the records are held in a representative capacity, the in86
quiry is whether the custodian has a privacy interest in the records.
fendant had only to prove that he was a union member and that the records
would incriminate him in order to invoke the fifth amendment. Id.
79. Id. at 699.
80. Id.

81. Id. As the Court stated, custodians "in their official capacity.., have no
privilege against self-incrimination." Id. In Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85
(1973), the Court based this holding on two separate considerations. The first
was a pragmatic consideration which recognized that a valid fifth amendment
claim by a custodian would frustrate governmental attempts to gain access to
business records. Id. at 90. Recognition of a custodian's claim would give a
derivative privilege to the collective entity and "would substantially undermine
the unchallenged rule that the organization itself is not entitled to claim any
Fifth Amendment privilege." Id. The second basis for the holding is the
Supreme Court's belief that the fifth amendment protects an individual's "private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought." Id. at 91 (quoting Couch
v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973)). In order to successfully invoke the
fifth amendment, the government must be intruding upon an individual's privacy. Id. In the case of a collective entity's records, a custodian has no privacy
interest in the records and therefore the fifth amendment is inapplicable. Id. at
91-92. For a further discussion of a custodian's privacy interest in the collective
entity's records, see infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
82. See Note, supra note 24, at 104 (representative capacity doctrine rulings
effectively overruled Boyd).
83. See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 90 (if records held in capacity as entity's representative, then fifth amendment is inapplicable); White, 322 U.S. at 699 (same).
84. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 91 (protection of privacy is second policy underlying
application of fifth amendment privilege).
85. Id. (fifth amendment bars compulsory production of individual's
papers).
86. White, 322 U.S. at 700 (if records "embody no element of personal pri-
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Facts significant in determining whether a custodian has a substantial
privacy interest in the records are the custodian's power to prevent
others from inspecting the records, 8 7 the custodian's control over the
contents and location of the records, 88 and whether maintenance of the
records is regulated by statute. 89 If the custodian has a substantial privacy interest in the records, he is holding them in a personal capacity
and consequently can claim his own personal fifth amendment privilege
to prevent production.9"
In sum, the Court established that a custodian must have a personal
privacy interest in the records in order to exercise his personal fifth
amendment privilege. Without this privacy interest, the custodian is
deemed to hold the records in his representative capacity. While a custodian acts in his representative capacity he assumes the privileges and
obligations of the entity which he represents. If the custodian represents a collective entity, the custodian cannot claim any fifth amendment
privilege because the entity has none. 9 1 Consequently, the custodian
vacy... [they] carry with them no claim of personal privilege"); see also Bellis, 417
U.S. at 97 n.8 (mere existence of ownership interest is not in itself sufficient to
establish claim of privilege).

87. White, 322 U.S. at 699-700. The Court found that the custodian had no
power to prevent inspection of the records by other members of the union. Id.
at 699. Therefore, the records "embod[ied] no element of personal privacy."
Id. at 700. Similarly in Bellis, the Court found that the records of collective entities are often regulated by statute and the custodian "lacks the control over their
content and location and the right to keep them from the view of others .... "
Bellis, 417 U.S. at 92. Therefore, the custodian did not have a privacy interest in
the records sufficient to invoke the fifth amendment. Id. Interestingly, the
Court then resurrected the visitorial power of the state rationale. Id. The Court
stated that this rationale itself was premised on the fact that corporations have
no privacy interest in their records. Id. For a discussion of this rationale, see
supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. Therefore, the denial of a privilege to

the corporation itself can be analyzed through use of the privacy analysis rather
than on the reserved right of visitation. The clear implication is that the rationale for denial of a fifth amendment privilege to a collective entity also has
changed from the inherent power of the state to enforce its laws to a privacy
analysis. If a state chooses to regulate records of collective entities, then the
collective entities have no privacy interest in the records and therefore cannot
refuse to produce them. This analysis, however, "presupposes the existence of
an organization which is recognized as an independent entity apart from its individual members." Id. Presumably, then, if a state could legitimately regulate the
private records of individuals, such as diaries, this would deprive the individual
of a privacy interest in the records and thus strip them of their privileged status.
88. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 92.
89. Id.
90. White, 322 U.S. at 700; Bellis, 417 U.S. at 92. If the custodian lacks the

power to deny access to other members of the organization and lacks substantial
authority concerning the contents and location of the records, the "characteristic[s] of a claim of privacy are absent." Id.
91. In Bellis, the Court abandoned reliance upon the inherent power of the

state to enforce its laws as a rationalization for denying collective entities a fifth
amendment privilege and instead substituted a privacy rationale. Bellis, 417 U.S.
at 92. If states regulate the content, location and accessibility of the records, a
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assumes the entity's obligation to produce the requested records.
4.

The Limitation on the Scope of the Representative Capacity Doctrine

Although the Court has been uniform in its denial of fifth amendment protection to collective entities and their custodians with respect
to the contents of business records, the Court has been unwavering in
its protection of a custodian's personal rights and privileges. In Curcio v.
United States,9 2 the Court declined to extend the representative capacity
doctrine to include compulsion of a custodian's testimony concerning
93
the location of subpoenaed records.
In Curcio, the government subpoenaed Joseph Curcio, the custodian
of records and secretary-treasurer of a labor union, to appear before a
grand jury and produce the union's books and records. 94 The subpoena
was addressed to Curcio in his capacity as secretary-treasurer. 9 5 Curcio
appeared and testified that the records were not in his possession and
thereafter refused to answer questions pertaining to their location on
fifth amendment grounds. 9 6 The government argued that because
Curcio was custodian of the union's records, his testimony regarding the
books would have been given in his capacity as custodian. 9 7 Therefore,
collective entity does not have a privacy interest in the records and thus cannot
refuse to produce them in response to a valid subpoena. Id. at 92-93. However,
the Court limited this privacy analysis only to entities which are "independent
entit[ies] apart from [their] individual members." Id. at 92. Furthermore, such

an entity must "maintain a distinct set of organizational records, and recognize
rights in its members of control and access to them." Id. at 93. Therefore, a
court must first determine whether a collective entity exists and then whether it
has a privacy interest in its records. Although this seems to repudiate the older
corporate and collective entity cases which denied a fifth amendment privilege in
every case, a "substantial claim of privacy or confidentiality cannot often be
maintained with respect to the financial records of an organized collective en-

tity." Id. at 92. Indeed, in light of Bellis, which held a three-person partnership
had no privacy interest in the records, it is extremely doubtful that a court will

find that a collective entity has a substantial privacy interest in its records.
92. 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
93. Id. at 128.
94. Id. at 119. The government was conducting an investigation into possible racketeering in labor unions throughout New York City. Id. Pursuant to this
investigation, the government subpoenaed Curcio to produce the union's
records. Id.
95. Id.

96. Id. Curcio testified that he was the union's secretary-treasurer and that
the union did have records, but that they were not in his possession. Id. The
district court then ordered Curcio to answer fifteen questions concerning the
whereabouts of the books. Id. at 119-20. The district court found that Curcio
had not sufficiently demonstrated that his answers would incriminate him and
therefore the fifth amendment was inapplicable. Id. at 120-21. After Curcio
again refused to answer the questions, the district court found him guilty of
criminal contempt. Id. at 121. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and
held the fifth amendment did not "attach to questions relating to the whereabouts of union books." Id.
97. Id. at 123. The government did not argue to the Supreme Court that
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no fifth amendment privilege would attach to Curcio's testimony because when acting in a representative capacity, Curcio assumed the
98
union's lack of a fifth amendment privilege.
The Court rejected the government's argument. It held that a custodian only assumes the entity's privileges and duties with respect to the
contents of the records. 9 9 Moreover, the Court stated that the government cannot compel a custodian to orally incriminate himself even if the
custodian's testimony is given in his representative capacity.' 00 The
Court distinguished the production of records from testimony concerning the records. While the custodian has no "legally cognizable interest" in the records themselves,' 0 ' the custodian's testimony about them
would force him to "disclose the contents of his own mind."' 0 2 In addition, the Court reasoned that the fifth amendment protects against such
governmental intrusions into an individual's "inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought."' 0 3 Although Curcio dealt specifically with oral
testimony, the Court made clear that the disclosure of the contents of
Curcio had failed to show that his answers would incriminate him. Id. Instead,
the government's only argument was that the fifth amendment privilege did not
attach to questions concerning the whereabouts of records ordered by the subpoena. Id. at 121 n.2.
98. Id. For a discussion of why a custodian, when acting in a representative
capacity, has no fifth amendment privilege, see supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
99. 354 U.S. at 124-25. In this fifth amendment analysis, the Court's attention is fixed entirely upon the contents of the records and not upon the actual,
physical act of production. Therefore, when the Court states that a custodian
has no privilege with regard to the documents, it is referring to the contents and
not to any incriminating aspects resulting from the production of the documents. The act of production doctrine had yet to be developed at the time of
Curcio. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). For a discussion of the
act of production doctrine and how it differs from the representative capacity
doctrine, see infra notes 105-46 and accompanying text.
100. Curcio, 354 U.S. at 124 (custodians of records "may decline to utter
upon the witness stand a single self-incriminating word. They may demand that
any accusation against them individually be established without the aid of their
oral testimony .....
(quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 385
(1911)).
101. Id. at 128. This refers to the finding in United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694 (1944), that custodians of collective entities' records did not have a
sufficient privacy interest in the records to successfully invoke the fifth amendment. For a further discussion of the privacy analysis employed in White, see
supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
102, 354 U.S. at 128. Because the Court has stated that the fifth amendment protects an individual's privacy, the fact that testimony which reveals the
contents of one's mind is protected means that the individual has a privacy interest in his own thoughts. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1973). Therefore, the fifth amendment privilege serves to protect the custodian if the
government seeks to intrude upon his "private inner sanctum" of individual privacy to extract incriminating information. Curcio, 354 U.S. at 128.
103. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 91 (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
327 (1973)). Inside this inner sanctum are the defendant's privacy interests
which are protected by the fifth amendment. Note, supra note 24, at 101.
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the custodian's mind was the factor which brought this case within the
0 4
ambit of fifth amendment protection.
C.

The Act of Production Doctrine

The Supreme Court's traditional approach to documents and
records extended fifth amendment protection to the contents of records
provided that the owner or possessor had a privacy interest in the documents. 10 5 Therefore, an owner with a privacy interest could permanently deprive the government of the records unless he received
immunity from use of the record's contents.' 0 6 However, the successful
assertion of a fifth amendment privilege had the effect of keeping useful,
if not crucial, information from the government.10 7 In order to alleviate
this serious difficulty, the Court has recently adopted a more literal and
104. The Court stated that because the custodian had no "legally cognizable interest" in a corporation's records, it was justifiable to compel him to produce them. Curcio, 354 U.S. at 128. However, the Court held that oral testimony
could not be compelled because it requires a custodian to disclose the contents
of his own mind. Id. Therefore, the disclosure of one's mind gives a custodian a
"legally cognizable interest" upon which to assert a fifth amendment privilege.

Id. Reading this "legally cognizable interest" along with later cases demonstrates that the Court meant that a custodian had a sufficient privacy interest in
his own thoughts to invoke the protections of the fifth amendment. See Bellis,
417 U.S. at 91 (fifth amendment protects individual's privacy).
105. See, e.g., Bellis, 417 U.S. at 91-92 (fifth amendment protects individual's
privacy, so one needs privacy interest in documents to assert privilege).
106. In order for a grant of immunity to overcome a fifth amendment privilege, it must be "coextensive with the scope of the privilege." Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 449 (1972). If the grant of immunity "has removed the
dangers against which the [fifth amendment] privilege protects," the defendant
cannot refuse to testify. Id. In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892),
the Court held that only transactional immunity was sufficient to overcome a
valid fifth amendment defense. Id. at 585-86. Transactional immunity "afford[s]
absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the [government's] question relates." Id. at 586. However, in Kastigar, the Court held
that transactional immunity actually offered greater protection than that of the
fifth amendment. 406 U.S. at 453. Recognizing that a person who successfully
invokes the fifth amendment may still be prosecuted, the Court held that a more
limited "use" immunity was coextensive with fifth amendment protections, and
thus constitutional. Id. Use immunity prevents information supplied by the defendant and any information discovered as a result of the defendant's admissions from being used against him. Id. Therefore, "[i]mmunity from the use of
compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived directly or indirectly therefrom" is sufficient to overcome a fifth amendment claim. Id. Once information
is obtained under a grant of use immunity, the prosecution bears the burden of
proving that evidence used against the defendant was not directly or indirectly
derived from the previous admissions. Id. at 460. This burden "imposes on the
prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." Id. If the government fails to meet its burden, the evidence will be suppressed. Congress has provided for use immunity in federal prosecutions. See

18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1982).
107. Heidt, supra note 18, at 465 (privacy approach resulted in unwarranted
suppression of many documents).
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restrictive interpretation of the fifth amendment which has permanently
stripped the contents of records of their privileged status.' 0 8 Although
the Court applied the traditional elements required to make out a fifth
amendment claim, it applied these elements in a new, more analytical
manner. 0 9 In order to successfully invoke the fifth amendment, a communication must be (1) compelled, (2) testimonial and (3) incriminating. 110 This analysis has shifted scrutiny from the contents of the
records to the physical act of producing the documents in order to ascertain the applicability of the fifth amendment."'
1.

Compulsion

The fifth amendment by its express language, protects only against
compelled self-incrimination.' 12 In early cases, the Court had accepted
without question the proposition that a subpoena ordering the production of documents was in reality compelling the individual subject to the
subpoena to produce the contents of those documents for use by the
government."l 3 Therefore, an individual could assert a fifth amendment claim if the contents of the records would incriminate him. 114 In
108. This new approach has come to be known as the act of production
doctrine. The Court developed the doctrine in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391 (1976) and United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). For a discussion of
the act of production doctrine and of these cases, see infra notes 105-46 and
accompanying text.
109. See Note, United States v. Doe and its Progeny: A Reevaluation of the Fifth
Amendment's Application to Custodians of Corporate Records, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 793,

803 (1986) (Court announced new analytical framework for fifth amendment
analysis in Fisher).
For a discussion of how this new approach differed from the Court's traditional approach to the production of documents, see infra notes 203-40 and accompanying text.
110. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 610-11 (government subpoena compels custodian
of records to perform act which may have testimonial aspects and incriminating
effect, all of which must be present to invoke fifth amendment); Fisher, 425 U.S.
at 408 (individual is only protected by fifth amendment when compelled to make
testimonial communication which is incriminating). See also Comment, supra
note 76, at 1615; Note, supra note 24, at 106-07; Note, Corporate Record-Keepers
And The Right Against Self-Incrimination: An Equitable Approach To Fifth Amendment
Analysis, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 411, 426 (1987).

111. Comment, supra note 76, at 1606 (act of production doctrine focused
on act of producing documents rather than on contents of documents to determine whether fifth amendment is implicated); Note, supra note 109, at 794 (contents of business records not privileged under fifth amendment but individual
can assert fifth amendment privilege for act of producing documents).
112. The fifth amendment states that "no person .

.

. shall be compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. (emphasis added).
113. Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 2298 (1988) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (decisions in previous representative capacity cases premised on fact
that custodian's claims concerned incrimination in regard to contents of
documents).
114. In the past, the Court had considered whether the contents of the sub-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 5

370

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34: p. 353

Fisher v. United States,1 15 and in Doe v. United States,'

16 the Court rejected
this traditional approach and instead relied on a much more technical
and rigid interpretation of "compulsion."
The Court recognized that the ordinary subpoena does not compel
an individual to create the contents of the requested records.' 17 In the
vast majority of cases, the individual compiles the records without governmental compulsion. Instead, the subpoena, in the most literal sense,
only compels an individual to produce the records. 1 18 Because the subpoena compels the production of records and not their creation, the
Court held that the contents of the records were no longer privileged
regardless of their incriminating nature.' 19 In adopting this approach,
the Court limited fifth amendment claims concerning business docu20
ments solely to the act of producing the requested records.'

poenaed records would incriminate the individual asserting the privilege. See
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1973) (partner in law firm claimed contents
of firm's records would incriminate him); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694,
696 (1943) (custodian of union records claimed contents of records would incriminate him); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 385 (1911) (production
of records incriminated custodian because of information contained in
documents).
115. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). In Fisher, a consolidation of two cases with similar facts, a subpoena directed taxpayers' attorneys to produce papers which the
attorneys held in a fiduciary capacity. Id. at 394. The attorneys had been retained to assist the taxpayers in connection with an Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) investigation. Id. After discussions with IRS agents, the taxpayers obtained documents relating to their tax return preparations from their accountants and transferred these documents to their attorneys. Id. After learning the
whereabouts of the records, the IRS served a subpoena on the attorneys requesting production of the records. Id. The attorneys claimed that compliance
with the subpoena would involve a violation of their clients' fifth amendment
rights. Id. at 395. Although recognizing that normally a person may not invoke
the fifth amendment on behalf of another, the Court held that due to the attorney-client privilege, if the records were privileged in the taxpayers' possession,
they would be privileged in the attorneys' possession. Id. at 404.
116. 465 U.S. 605 (1984). In Doe, the government was investigating possible corruption in the awarding of civil and municipal contracts. Id. at 606. The
defendant was the owner of several sole proprietorships which had their records
subpoenaed in the course of the investigation. Id.
117. Fisher,425 U.S. at 409-10, 410 n. I1 (ordinary subpoena does not compel person to create records and fact that person asserting privilege actually
wrote records is insufficient to trigger privilege).
118. Id. at 410 n.1 1 ("In the case of documentary subpoena the only thing
compelled is the act of producing the document .... ").
119. Id. at 409-10 ("[Where] the preparation of all the papers . . . was
wholly voluntary ....
they cannot be said to contain compelled testimonial evidence .... The [defendant] cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena merely
by asserting that the item of evidence which he is required to produce contains
incriminating writing .).
See also Note, supra note 109, at 804 (fifth amendment does not protect contents of business records).
120. See Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 2290 (1988) (Fisherand
Doe developed doctrine which denies all business records fifth amendment privilege but which allows act of producing documents to be privileged). However,
there is a dispute whether non-business records, such as diaries, are subject to
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Testimonial

Although the fifth amendment speaks in terms of being a witness
against oneself,' 2 ' the Court has recognized that oral testimony is only
one manner through which a person may incriminate himself. 122 However, the Court has consistently recognized that not every compelled act
which incriminates the individual deserves fifth amendment protection. 123 Further, even certain oral statements are excluded from the
fifth amendment shield. 124 In deciding which potential evidence deserves constitutional protection, the Court has held that only "testimo25
nial" evidence is protected.'
The Court has determined that a primary purpose of the fifth
amendment is to protect the sanctity of an individual's thoughts and
feelings. 126 Therefore, in order for a compelled act to be considered
the act of production doctrine. Justice O'Connor believes that the fifth amendment "provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of
any kind." Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor,J., concurring). Conversely,Justices
Marshall and Brennan feel that Justice O'Connor's pronouncement is overly
broad. They "continue to believe that under the Fifth Amendment 'there are
certain documents no person ought to be compelled to produce.' " Id. at 619
(Marshall,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 431-32 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring)). Because personal, non-business records implicate a higher degree of concern for privacy
interests,Justices Marshall and Brennan believe that they are not subject to compulsion under the act of production doctrine and instead are analyzed under the
traditional privacy approach. Id. As of this writing, this dispute has not been
resolved.
121. For the relevant language of the fifth amendment, see supra note 1.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 3 (1973) (defendant incriminated himself by providing voice exemplar); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263, 265-66 (1967) (compelled provision of handwriting exemplar was incriminating); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 219-20 (1967) (standing in line-up
viewed by crime victim incriminated defendant); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 758-59 (1966) (compelled provision of blood sample was incriminating); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910) (modeling blouse was
incriminating).
123. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 5 (compelled provision of incriminating voice exemplar did not violate fifth amendment); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 266 (compelled provision of handwriting exemplar did not violate fifth amendment); Wade, 388 U.S.
at 221 (compelling accused to stand in line-up not violative of fifth amendment);
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 (compelled provision of blood sample did not violate
fifth amendment); Holt, 218 U.S. at 252-53 (compelled modeling of blouse did
not violate fifth amendment).
124. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 5-6 (provision of voice exemplar did not violate
fifth amendment because statement given was not used for its content but only
for comparison); Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957) (testimony
authenticating books produced in response to subpoena did not violate fifth
amendment).
125. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 (fifth amendment privilege protects accused
only against being compelled to provide evidence of testimonial nature).
126. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1973) ("We have recognized
that the Fifth Amendment 'respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling
and thought' ....
(quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973)).
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testimonial, it must reveal the contents of the accused's mind. 12 7 Thus,
128
handwriting 129
compelling an individual to provide blood samples,
30
or voice exemplars,'
or compelling the accused to stand in a line3
up, 1 or model a blouse13 2 are not testimonial acts regardless of how
incriminating the resulting evidence may be. In these situations the ac133
cused is not forced to reveal the contents of his mind.
The critical question concerning the Court's act of production analysis was whether the production of records was a testimonial act.1 34 In
holding that the act of producing documents can be testimonial in nature, the Court recognized that producing the records has many of the
same characteristics of oral testimony.' 3 5 The Court noted that, in responding to a subpoena, the custodian concedes the existence of the
records, their possession by the custodian and indicates the custodian's

belief that the records produced are those demanded by the subpoena. 136 That is, the custodian is using his own thoughts to assemble
documents which he believes are responsive to the subpoena and he relates those thoughts to a grand jury when he produces the documents.
Therefore, the production of documents can be a testimonial act deservSee also Note, supra note 24, at 101 (fifth amendment assures respect for individuals' personality and right of individual to private enclave to lead private life).
127. Curcio, 354 U.S. at 128 ("[F]orcing the custodian to testify orally as to
the whereabouts of non-produced records requires him to disclose the contents
of his own mind. He might be compelled to convict himself out of his own
mouth. That is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Fifth Amendment."); see
also Note, supra note 37, at 1550 ("To be testimonial, evidence must reveal the
contents of one's mind.").
128. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 (withdrawal of blood does not provide state
with testimonial evidence).
129. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (handwriting exemplar not testimonial because not used for content of what was written).
130. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973) (voice exemplar not
testimonial because not used for testimonial content of what was said).
131. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 (1967) (compelling accused
to exhibit self for observation involves no compulsion of testimonial evidence).
132. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910) (using body as
comparative evidence does not exact communications from him).
133. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957) (compelling custodian to reveal contents of mind is contrary to spirit and letter of fifth

amendment).
134. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (more difficult issue

is whether custodian's averments are testimonial for purposes of applying fifth
amendment).
135. Id. (although contents of documents are not privileged, "act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own ....

"); Curcio, 354 U.S. at 125 (orally authenticating records

produced in response to subpoena does no more than make explicit what is implicit in act of production).
136. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 ("Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers . . . their possession or control by the [custodian, and] . . . would indicate the [custodian's] belief that the papers are those
described in the subpoena.").
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ing of fifth amendment protection, provided that the information obtained as a result of this act is incriminating to the custodian.
3.

Incriminating

In order to receive fifth amendment protection, the compelled communication must be incriminating as well as testimonial.1 37 In general,
to be incriminating, the evidence need not conclusively prove an accused's guilt. Rather, the evidence need only provide a "link in the evidentiary chain" connecting the accused to a crime. 138 In Doe, however,
the Court stated that a person wishing to "claim the Fifth Amendment
privilege must be 'confronted by substantial and "real," and not merely
trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.' ,,139 In demanding a
substantial risk of incrimination, the Court apparently meant that the
defendant must "reasonably believ[e] [that the disclosure] could be used
in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be
so used." 140 Therefore, the more likely the government will use the
incriminating evidence, the more substantial and real the hazards of incrimination become. 14 1 If a defendant does prove that the production
of the requested documents is incriminating, the government may then
rebut that finding by "producing evidence that possession, existence,
and authentication were a 'foregone conclusion.' "142 The government
may do so by proving that it has independent evidence of the existence,
possession and authenticity of the requested records, so that the custodian's act of production adds nothing to the government's information. 14 3 The effect of the foregone conclusion test is to deprive an
individual of a fifth amendment claim when the individual's compelled
act adds nothing to the "sum total of the Government's
44
information." '
The Court in Fisher and Doe developed a new analysis for fifth
amendment claims regarding production of documentary evidence. In
137. Id. at 408 (fifth amendment protects only against compelled, testimonial and incriminating communications).
138. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 428 (1971) (information providing
link in chain of evidence leading to prosecution and conviction is incriminating).
139. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13 (quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39, 53 (1968)).
140. Doe v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2341, 2348 (1988) (quoting Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972)); Note, supra note 37, at 1553 ("substantial risk" of incrimination requires assessment of likelihood that evidence
will be used by government).
141. Note, supra note 37, at 1553 ("substantial risk" indicates that likelihood of use is what is incriminating about evidence).
142. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391,411 (1976)).
143. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411 (existence, location and custodian's admission
of possession of records are foregone conclusions if they add little or nothing to
sum total of government's information).
144. Id.
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holding that a subpoena only compels the production of documents, the
Court stripped the contents of business records of fifth amendment protection regardless of how incriminating the contents may be. 1 4 5 However, by holding that the act of production is a testimonial act, 14 6 the
Court granted a limited fifth amendment privilege to custodians provided they show the act of production involves testimonial selfincrimination.
D.

Braswell v. United States

After Doe the circuits split as to the effect the act of production analysis

1 47

had on the collective entity doctrine 14 8 and particularly the effect

it had on the representative capacity corollary 14 9 to the collective entity
doctrine. Some circuits held that the act of production analysis replaced
the representative capacity doctrine and allowed the custodian to assert
a fifth amendment privilege.' 50 Others held that the collective entity
and representative capacity doctrines remained unchanged in the wake
of Doe.' i The Supreme Court resolved this split among the circuits in
Braswell v. United States.

1

52

Braswell was the sole stockholder in two Mississippi corporations.1 53 In accordance with Mississippi law, each corporation had three
145. Dispute does exist as to whether the act of production doctrine strips
contents of all records of their formerly privileged status. For a discussion of
this dispute, see supra note 120.
146. For a discussion of why the act of production is testimonial, see supra

notes 121-36 and accompanying text.
147. For a discussion of the act of production doctrine, see supra notes 10546 and accompanying text.
148. For a discussion of the collective entity doctrine, see supra notes 44-65
and accompanying text.
149. For a discussion of the representative capacity doctrine, see supra
notes 66-91 and accompanying text.
150. See In re Grand Jury No. 86-3 (Will Rogers Corp.), 816 F.2d 569 (11 th
Cir. 1987) (record custodian can assert personal fifth amendment privilege to
avoid having to produce records himself); United States v. Antonio J. Sancetta,
M.D., P.C., 788 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1986) (act of production doctrine prohibits
government from compelling custodian to produce documents if it would in-

criminate him); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985)
(en banc) (custodian can show that production and authentication would incriminate him and avoid personally producing subpoenaed records).
151. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143 (6th
Cir.) (en banc) (collective entity rule prevents custodian of corporate records
from relying on act of production doctrine to avoid production), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1033 (1985); United States v. Malis, 737 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1984) (custodian may not assert fifth amendment privilege to avoid producing records held
in representative capacity); In re GrandJury Proceedings (Vargas), 727 F.2d 941
(10th Cir.) (en banc) (records held in representative capacity are not protected
by fifth amendment, even after development of act of production doctrine), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
152. 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988).
153. Id. at 2286.
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officers,' 54 but Braswell retained all the authority in each corporation. 15 5 A federal grand jury subpoenaed Braswell in his capacity as
president of the two corporations, ordering him to produce the records
of both corporations.1 56 Braswell moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that producing the documents would incriminate him personally.157
The district court denied Braswell's motion to quash, holding that the
collective entity doctrine prevented him from asserting a fifth amendment privilege with regard to corporate records. 158 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision, asserting
that Braswell, in his capacity as custodian of the corporations' records,
had no privilege with regard to the records.' 59 The Supreme Court af16 0
firmed the Fifth Circuit by a 5-4 vote.
Braswell raised two arguments in attacking the Fifth Circuit's holding. First, Braswell argued that the act of production doctrine had replaced the collective entity and representative capacity doctrines. He
asserted that the production doctrine abandoned the privacy-based representative capacity rationale 16 and replaced it with a testimonial communication standard.' 6 2 Therefore, he argued that while the contents
of business records are never privileged, the act of producing the documents may be, regardless of the type of entity the custodian represents. 163 He then argued that his act of producing the documents would
have "independent testimonial significance, which would incriminate
him individually ....
,,164 Therefore, under the act of production analysis, he was privileged to refuse compliance with the subpoena.' 6 5
Secondly, Braswell argued that even if the entity and representative
154. Id.

155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

159. Id. at 2286-87. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 814 F.2d

190, 192 (1987) (individual enjoys no fifth amendment privilege from producing
records of collective entity).

160. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices O'Connor, White,
Blackmun and Stevens in affirming the Fifth Circuit's decision. 108 S.Ct. at
2286. Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Scalia in
dissent. Id. at 2296.
161. 108 S. Ct. at 2290. For a discussion of the privacy rationale, see supra
notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
162. 108 S.Ct. at 2290. For a discussion of the testimonial communication
standard, see supra notes 121-36 and accompanying text.
163. 108 S. Ct. at 2290.
164. Id. at 2287. Recognizing that the subpoena compelled the production
of the records, Braswell alleged that production was both testimonial and incriminating. Therefore, under the act of production doctrine as developed in
Doe, the government could not compel Braswell to personally produce the
records. For a discussion of the act of production doctrine, see supra notes 10546 and accompanying text.
165. 108 S. Ct. at 2287.
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capacity doctrines continued unchanged despite the development of the
act of production doctrine, the Court had carved out an exception to the
representative capacity doctrine. Specifically, this exception provided a
fifth amendment privilege to a custodian if he was compelled to perform
a testimonial act.16 6 Braswell based this argument upon the Curcio case,
which granted the custodian a privilege to refuse to answer questions
16 7
concerning the location of the entity's records.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, rejected both of
these arguments. First, the Court held that the collective entity doctrine
stands for the proposition that collective entities are treated differently
than individuals. 168 The Court reasoned that the history of the collective entity doctrine demonstrates that collective entities are not entitled
to any fifth amendment privilege. 169 The Court stated that this fundamental principle of the collective entity doctrine could never be altered
regardless of the type of analysis employed. 170 Moreover, the Court
held that the representative capacity corollary to the entity doctrine also
survived the development of the act of production doctrine. 17' Without
analyzing the rationale for the creation of the representative capacity
corollary, the Court held that the custodian assumed certain obligations,
among them the duty to produce the entity's documents on demand by
the government, which cannot be avoided by invoking the fifth amendment.172 Because the custodian is acting in his representative capacity
in delivering the records, the act of production is not his but rather that
of the entity.' 7 3 Therefore, the Court asserted that to recognize a privilege in the act of production would, in effect, give a fifth amendment
166. Id. at 2293.
167. Id. For a discussion of Curcio, see supra notes 92-98 and accompanying
text.
168. 108 S. Ct. at 2288. The Court noted that "we have long recognized
that for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, corporations and other collective
entities are treated differently from individuals." Id.
169. Id. at 2288-90. The Court stated that it is "settled that a corporation
has no Fifth Amendment privilege." Id. at 2288 (citing Hale v. Henkel, 210 U.S.
43 (1905)).
170. Id. at 2290-92. The Court stated that "[t]he plain mandate of these
[collective entity] decisions is that ...

a corporate custodian such as [Braswell]

may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds."
Id. at 2290. Further, in the act of production cases, "[tihe Court... reaffirmed
the obligation of a corporate custodian to comply with a subpoena addressed to
him." Id. at 2292.
171. Id. at 2291. The Court held that the representative capacity doctrine
"undergirding the collective entity decisions, in which custodians asserted that
production of entity records would incriminate them personally, survive[d]" the
development of the act of production doctrine. Id.
172. Id. "[A] custodian's assumption of his representative capacity leads to
certain obligations, including the duty to produce corporate records on proper
demand by the Government." Id.
173. Id. The Court held that the "custodian's act of production is not
deemed a personal act, but rather an act of the corporation." Id.
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privilege to an entity which does not possess such a privilege. 174
The Court also rejected Braswell's reading of the Curcio decision.
The Braswell Court held that Curcio did not stand for the proposition that
a custodian has a fifth amendment privilege for incriminating testimonial communications. Rather, Curcio granted an exception solely for oral
testimony. 175 In support of its conclusion, the Court quoted the language from Curcio which stated that a custodian cannot be compelled to
"condemn himself by his own oral testimony."' 176 Relying on this and
prior cases which also had held that a custodian does not waive his fifth
amendment privilege with respect to oral testimony,1 77 the Court held
that Braswell could not avail himself of the Curcio exception because he
178
was not being compelled to give oral testimony.
The Court thus rejected both of Braswell's arguments and unequivocally held that a custodian of corporate records has no fifth amendment
privilege in producing corporate records. The Court then developed a
rule preventing the government from making evidentiary use of the custodian's individual act of producing the records against the custodian
personally.1 79 Because the custodian acts as a representative of the corporation rather than as an individual, the government cannot present
evidence that the "subpoena was served upon and the corporation's
documents were delivered by one particular individual, the custodian."' 180 Instead, according to the Court, the government may only
174. Id. (claim of fifth amendment privilege asserted by custodian would be
tantamount to claim of privilege by corporation).
175. Id. at 2293-94. The Court held that Curcio made it clear "that with
respect to a custodian of a collective entity's records, the line drawn was between
oral testimony and other forms of incrimination." Id. at 2293.
176. Id. at 2293 (emphasis added by Court) (quoting Curcio v. United
States, 354 U.S. 118, 123-24 (1957)). For a discussion of why the Curcio Court's
use of oral testimony is not significant, see infra note 275 and accompanying
text.
177. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 27 (1948) (oral testimony can be
compelled only by exchange of immunity); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361, 385 (1911) (custodian may decline to incriminate himself through
testifying).
178. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2293-94. The Court found it significant that the
Curcio Court had recognized that the act of producing records is testimonial in
nature. Id. at 2293. Therefore, because the Curcio Court did not find the act of
production incriminating and thus protected by the fifth amendment, the Curcio
Court must have intended its exception to the representative capacity doctrine
to be limited to oral testimony only. Id.
179. Id. at 2295. Because the Court held that the custodian's act of producing the records is actually the corporation's act, the government "may make no
evidentiary use of the 'individual act' against the individual." Id.
180. Id. The approach developed by the Court is quite similar to that of the
Sixth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143 (6th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985). In Morganstern, the court held
that "if the government later attempts to implicate the custodian on the basis of
the act of production, evidence of that fact is subject to a motion to suppress."
Id. at 148. The court in Morganstern held that the fifth amendment is inapplicable
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present evidence that the subpoena was served and that the records
were produced, leaving it up to the jury to draw the "conclusion that the
records in question are authentic corporate records, which the corporation possessed, and which it produced in response to the subpoena." 18 '
The Court then stated that the government may introduce evidence of
the custodian's position in the corporation. This allows the jury to "reasonably infer that he had possession of the documents or knowledge of
their contents ....
Because the jury is not told that the defendant produced the records, any nexus between the defendant and the documents
results solely from the corporation's act of production and other evidence in the case." 18 2 Although the majority did not link this "evidentiary use" rule to the fifth amendment, the rule does provide protection
similar to use immunity. 18 3 Therefore, Braswell received diluted fifth
amendment protection for his act of production even though the majority held that he has no fifth amendment privilege in these
184
circumstances.
In contrast to the majority, Justice Kennedy, in dissent, stated that
the continued validity of the representative capacity doctrine was irrelevant to the issue presented in Braswell.18 5 Instead, the issue was one of
to a custodian because his act of producing the records is not testimonial because he acts in his representative capacity. Id. Therefore, the custodian cannot
meet the basic requirements needed to invoke the act of production doctrine.
Once the government attempts to introduce the evidence at trial, it is giving
testimonial significance to an otherwise testimony-free act. Id. Once the custodian's act is given testimonial significance, presumably the fifth amendment
would operate to suppress the evidence.
181. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2301 (Kennedy,J., dissenting) (new rule confers upon individual
partial use immunity). The majority, however, rejected the suggestion that this
affords the custodian any use immunity at all. Rather, the "limitation is a necessary concomitant of the notion that a corporate custodian acts as an agent ...
when he produces corporate records." Id. at 2295 n. 11. Although the Court
disputed the notion that immunity has been conferred, the practical effect of the
limitation is to deprive the government of useful and legally obtained information. The limitation does not, however, offer the broad range of protection of
use immunity. For example, the government is apparently free to use evidence
indirectly derived from the act of production. However, it does at least provide
protection against using information directly and proximately derived from the
custodian's act. Therefore, as Justice Kennedy asserts, there has been at least a
partial judicial grant of use immunity. Id. at 2301 (KennedyJ., dissenting). The
Court has left the boundaries of the limitation undefined, so it is unclear
whether information indirectly derived from the act can be used. Extending this
evidentiary use restriction to exclude indirectly derived information, however,
would be tantamount to granting full use immunity. Therefore, the majority
would be extending use immunity to the custodian while maintaining that the
fifth amendment is inapplicable to a custodian's act of producing a collective
entity's records.
184. For a discussion of this diluted immunity, see supra note 183.
185. 108 S. Ct. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (validity of representative
capacity doctrine is not in issue before Court).
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18 6
Jusdetermining the scope of the representative capacity doctrine.

tice Kennedy asserted that the representative capacity doctrine does not
deny a custodian a fifth amendment privilege.' 8 7 Therefore, if a custodian can assert a valid fifth amendment claim, the representative capac18 8
ity doctrine does not prevent judicial recognition of the claim.
Justice Kennedy did not call into doubt the continued validity of the
collective entity doctrine.' 8 9 Rather, he questioned whether the collection entity doctrine "contains any principle which overrides the personal
Fifth Amendment privilege of someone compelled to give incriminating
testimony." 190 Justice Kennedy stated that in the collective entity cases,
the custodians were denied a fifth amendment privilege in the records
because they could not meet the minimum requirements necessary to
assert a fifth amendment claim. 19 1 However, Braswell satisfied the
threshold requirements of the act of production doctrine, and therefore
the denial of his claim of privilege flowed from his status as custodian.' 92 Justice Kennedy relied on Curcio to demonstrate that the entity
doctrine does not require a custodian to give up his fifth amendment
privilege when compelled to provide testimonial evidence, even when
the custodian acts in a representative capacity.' 93 Justice Kennedy additionally argued that Braswell's act of producing the documents cannot
be imputed to the corporation because the act disclosed the contents of
94
Braswell's mind. 1

Justice Kennedy further argued that the Court's evidentiary use rule
lends support to the custodian's claim of an act of production privi186. Id. at 2299 (Kennedy,J., dissenting) (issue presented is whether representative capacity doctrine allows compulsion of testimonial incriminating
information).
187. Id. at 2298 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (collective entity doctrine provides no support for Court's finding that custodian is not entitled to fifth amendment privilege).
188. Id. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (representative capacity doctrine
precedents establish firm basis for assertion of personal fifth amendment
privilege).
189. Id. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (question of validity of collective
entity rule is not before Court).
190. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
191. Id. See also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1973); United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 695 (1943). In both cases, the custodian was denied a fifth
amendment privilege because he could not assert a valid claim. Bellis, 417 U.S.
at 101; White, 322 U.S. at 704. Because the custodian had no privacy interest in
the records, their fifth amendment rights were not implicated. Bellis, 417 U.S. at
92; White, 322 U.S. at 699-700.
192. Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Braswell submitted on assumption that Braswell's act of production will involve testimonial selfincrimination).
193. Id. at 2300 (Kennedy,J., dissenting) (Curcio held that testimony cannot
be compelled from custodian even when acting in representative capacity).
194. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Braswell's act requires personal disclosure of individual knowledge, fact which cannot be dismissed by labeling him
agent).
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lege.' 9 5 He noted that the Court's holding denies a jury evidence which
the government has lawfully gathered. 196 Therefore, the only ground
on which this information can be excluded is that it violated the custodian's fifth amendment rights.1 9 7 However, according to Justice Kennedy, if the evidence is excluded because its use violates the custodian's
fifth amendment rights, then the government could not have compelled
the evidence from the custodian in the first place absent a grant of im:
munity.198 If the majority's evidentiary use restriction is the grant of
immunity necessary to overcome the custodian's fifth amendment claim,
then the Court has implicitly acknowledged that a custodian's personal
fifth amendment rights have been implicated by compliance with the
subpoena. 199 In Justice Kennedy's view, the fifth amendment is either
applicable or it is not. If it is not applicable, then the government has
legitimately obtained the evidence and there is no basis in precedent for
the majority to fashion new evidentiary rules. 200 The Court's development of the evidentiary use rule, according to the dissent, detracts from
its denial of the custodian's fifth amendment privilege. If the Court developed this rule because of fifth amendment concerns, the holding and
the evidentiary use rule cannot be reconciled. The fifth amendment
does not allow for the balancing of an individual's fifth amendment
rights against the convenience of the government in order to reach a
middle road. 20 ' Therefore, the dissent argued, if the fifth amendment is
applicable, "precedents require the Government to use the only mechanism yet sanctioned for compelling testimony which is privileged: a request for immunity ...."202
III.

ANALYSIS

The act of production doctrine as developed in Fisher and Doe recognized a fifth amendment privilege for the physical act of producing
195. Id. at 2296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (creation of use restriction admits
that compliance with subpoena implicates custodian's fifth amendment rights).
196. Id. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (use restriction deprives jury of
relevant information).
197. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (fifth amendment is only ground for declaring act of production information inadmissible).
198. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (if fifth amendment is applicable, government must make request for statutory use immunity).
199. Id. at 2296 (Kennedy,J., dissenting) (creation of use restriction admits
that compelled compliance with subpoena implicates custodian's fifth amendment rights).
200. Id. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (precedents require government
to request statutory immunity, rather than Court establishing new judicially created rules of evidence).
201. Id. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (fifth amendment does not permit
balancing of government convenience against witness' fifth amendment rights).

202. Id. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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subpoenaed documents. 20 3 In both cases, the extension of the privilege
did not turn "on who owned the papers, how they were created, or what
they said; instead [the holdings] rested on the fact that 'the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial self-incrimination.' "204 Because the act of production analysis did not depend upon
the status of the person holding the records, this Note submits that
Braswell should have been entitled to invoke the act of production doctrine to avoid having to personally produce the subpoenaed records.
His inability to do so is directly attributable to his status as custodian of
the corporations' records. 20 5 Therefore, Braswell's status as custodian
of corporate records overrode his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.
The Court based its rationale for this result on the representative
capacity corollary20 6 to the collective entity doctrine which denies custodians any fifth amendment privilege with respect to the production of
the entity's records. 20 7 The Court also stated that the act of production
doctrine did nothing to change this traditional approach. 208 As a result,
20 9
a custodian cannot avail himself of the act of production doctrine.
Part A of this section analyzes the purposes of the representative
capacity doctrine and submits that the act of production doctrine effectively achieves these purposes. Therefore, there is no longer a complling rationale for the existence of the collective entity doctrine.
Consequently, a custodian should be able to invoke the act of production doctrine. However, even if the collective entity doctrine has contin203. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984) (act of production is
privileged in appropriate circumstances).
204. Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting United
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613 (1984)).
205. The Court did not hold that the act of production in this case did not
involve testimonial self-incrimination. As Justice Kennedy noted, both the court
and the government assumed that the act of production would personally incriminate Braswell. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Court stated that had
Braswell conducted his businesses as sole proprietorships, under Doe he could
have availed himself of the act of production privilege. Id. at 2288. Because
Braswell operated his businesses in the corporate form, however, the Court denied him the act of production privilege. Id. Therefore, his status as corporate
custodian of records denied him a fifth amendment privilege.
206. The Court developed the representative capacity corollary primarily to
prevent frustration of the collective entity doctrine. The Court denied a custodian a fifth amendment privilege in the records because the custodian held these
records as a representative of the collective entity rather than in his personal
capacity. For a discussion of the representative capacity doctrine, see supra notes
66-91 and accompanying text.
207. 108 S.Ct. at 2290 ("plain mandate" of collective entity cases is that
corporate custodian may not resist subpoena for corporate records on fifth
amendment grounds).

208. Id. at 2290-91 (act of production doctrine did not render collective
entity doctrine obsolete).
209. Id. at 2291 (act of production doctrine did not render collective entity
rule obsolete).
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ued vitality, Part B of this section submits that the representative
capacity doctrine itself allows a custodian to invoke the fifth amendment
to avoid testimonial self-incrimination. Finally, Part C of this section
analyzes the Court's restriction on the use of evidence obtained as a result of the custodian's act of production, and submits that such a restriction is neither consistent with the Court's holding in Braswell nor an
effective substitute for fifth amendment protections.
A.

The Demise of the Representative Capacity Doctrine

It is submitted that the shift in fifth amendment protection from the
contents of the records to the testimonial nature of the act of production
has satisfied the basic purposes of the representative capacity doctrine. 2 10 Without these purposes, the representative capacity doctrine
no longer has a rationale which justifies its continued existence.
Residual law enforcement problems would exist as a result of granting
the custodian an act of production privilege. However, these problems
were anticipated when the fifth amendment was promulgated. Therefore, they are a necessary result of having the fifth amendment privilege
21
against self-incrimination. I
1.

The Purposes of the Representative Capacity Doctrine

As the Court stated in Bellis v. United States, 2 12 the representative
capacity doctrine has two rationales for its existence. First, the doctrine
was designed to prevent a collective entity from enjoying a fifth amendment privilege derived from the custodian's privilege. 2 13 Additionally,
the doctrine arose as a means to limit the fifth amendment to protection
2 14
of an individual's personal privacy.
a.

Prevention of a Derivative Fifth Amendment Privilege

The collective entity doctrine was, in large part, developed to ensure effective governmental regulation of business entities. 21 5 By denying collective entities any fifth amendment privilege, the Court assured
that a "cloak of . . . privilege" would not be thrown around business
210. For a discussion of the purposes of the representative capacity doctrine, see supra notes 66-91 and accompanying text.
211. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
212. 417 U.S. 85 (1973). For a discussion of the facts and holding of Bellis,
see supra note 56.
213. 417 U.S. at 90. A collective entity has no fifth amendment privilege
and, therefore, cannot refuse to produce its records in response to a valid subpoena on fifth amendment grounds. Id. If a custodian could assert a privilege
and thereby shield the collective entity's records from governmental inspection,
the entity would have a derivative privilege.
214. Id. at 91 (policy underlying fifth amendment privilege is protection of
individual's right to private enclave where he can lead private life).
215. For a discussion of the development of the collective entity doctrine,
see supra notes 32-65 and accompanying text.
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records. 2 16 However, if the custodian could assert a privilege in the
records' contents, the purpose of the collective entity doctrine would
often be frustrated. 217 Therefore, a primary purpose of the representative capacity doctrine was to ensure that the entity would not enjoy a
21 8
derivative privilege and thereby escape governmental regulation.
At the time of the development of the representative capacity doctrine, the threat that a custodian's claim of privilege would deny the government possession of the documents was a very real concern. Because
the Court focused its attention solely on the contents of the records, the
custodian's privilege would permanently deprive the government of the
records.2 19 Therefore, in order to obtain the records from the custodian, the government would have to grant him immunity with respect to
the record's contents, thereby rendering any prosecution of the custodian virtually impossible. 2 20 This result offended the Court's sense of
justice because collective entities can only commit crimes through the
actions of those in control of them. 22 1 Thus,.a person responsible for
the economic crime could not be prosecuted merely because he had possession of the entity's records, yet the tool used to complete the crime,
the entity itself, would bear the penalty of any sanctions. Therefore, the
Court developed the representative capacity doctrine to avoid the dilemma of choosing to forego inspection of an entity's records or granting immunity to a person likely to have been at least partly responsible
for any crime committed. By denying both the entity and custodian a
privilege in the records, the Court ensured that the government could
inspect the records and punish any and all offenders.
216. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2294 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694, 700 (1944)).
217. Id. Because the custodian could prevent governmental inspection of
the records so long as he had possession, the effectiveness of the collective entity
doctrine would be significantly reduced. Id.
218. Comment, supra note 47, at 1613 (purpose underlying representative
capacity doctrine was to prevent custodian from shielding entity through custodian's own privilege); Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege and Compelled Production of
Corporate Papers After Fisher and Doe, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 937 (1986) (pur-

pose behind representative capacity doctrine was prevention of granting entity
de facto fifth amendment privilege through custodian); Note, supra note 110, at
422-23 (only way to give effect to collective entity doctrine was by preventing
entity's individual representatives from invoking fifth amendment).
219. More accurately, a claim of privilege would deny the records to the
government so long as the custodian retained possession of the records. See
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 379 (1911). Because both the corporation and the custodian would be interested in preventing governmental inspection of records, it is unlikely that a custodian would voluntarily surrender the
records.
220. The immunity granted to the custodian would prevent the government from using any evidence found in the records or evidence in any way derived from the records. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
For a discussion of use immunity, see supra note 106.
221. See Note, supra note 28, at 1242 (discussing unfairness of imputing actions of agents to corporation).
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However, the act of production analysis fundamentally altered the
basic assumptions underlying the representative capacity doctrine.2 2 2
Because the production doctrine focuses strictly upon the specific action
actually compelled by the subpoena, the contents of the records will
never be protected by the fifth amendment. 2 23 The collective entity
2 24
doctrine, however, still denies entities a fifth amendment privilege.
Thus, the collective entity doctrine precludes the entity itself from asserting the act of production privilege, thereby avoiding governmental
inspection of its records. 2 25 Therefore, even if the custodian successfully asserts an act of production privilege, the collective entity still must
produce the documents. 2 26 The custodian, in asserting this privilege, is
222. Many commentators on this subject have reached the same conclusion. See Comment, supra note 76, at 1637 (policies underlying collective entity
doctrine do not prevent custodian from claiming act of production doctrine);
Note, supra note 37 (application of act of production doctrine rests on principles
of collective entity doctrine); Note, supra note 47, at 235 (because act of production doctrine addresses policy concerns underlying collective entity doctrinfe, it
is unnecessary to observe distinction between custodians of collective entities
and individuals); Note, supra note 109, at 793 (goals implicit in collective entity
doctrine provide basis for act of production doctrine).
223. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2287 (Court rejected argument that contents of
records are privileged). In complying with a subpoena, a record holder is not
compelled to create the contents of the records. Therefore, the contents of the
records are not compelled and thus not subject to fifth amendment protections.
See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 608 (1984) (contents of business records
not privileged because they are voluntarily created). For a further discussion of
why the contents of business records are no longer privileged, see supra notes
112-20 and accompanying text.
224. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2287 (artificial entities are not protected by fifth
amendment).
225. Id. at 2294 (if subpoena is addressed to corporation, it must find some
means to comply).
226. The collective entity must comply with a government subpoena. Id.
However, because the custodian has possession of the subpoenaed records, the
custodian might not turn over the records to the collective entity for ultimate
delivery to the government. Therefore, the entity could state that it is unable to
obtain the records from the custodian and, as a result, is unable to comply with
the subpoena through no fault of its own. If this is permitted, a corporation
interested in keeping its records from the government would simply not pressure the custodian to deliver the records to an alternative custodian and then
assert that it is unable to comply with the subpoena. The Court dealt with a
similar situation earlier in the development of the collective entity doctrine. In
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), Wilson, the president and custodian of the books, was subpoenaed to deliver the corporate records. Id. at 370.
A second subpoena was addressed to the corporation requesting the same
records. Id. Wilson refused either to produce the books himself or to give them
to the corporation for delivery to the government. Id. at 371. The Supreme
Court held that service of a subpoena "imposed upon the corporation the duty
of obedience." Id. at 376. Therefore, a corporation can be held in contempt for
failure to comply with a valid subpoena. Consequently, it must make a diligent
effort to obtain the books from the custodian in order to avoid contempt sanctions. Id. However, because the custodian is not directly affected by the contempt order against the corporation, it may be to the custodian's advantage to
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only stating that he cannot produce the records, not that the records
cannot be produced. Thus, because the representative capacity doctrine
was based, in large part, upon concerns dealing with the contents of the
records, this basis has been destroyed by the act of production analysis. 22 7 ,The combination of the act of production doctrine, which strips

the contents of records of their formerly privileged status, and the collective entity doctrine, which imposes upon a collective entity an absolute duty to produce subpoenaed records, effectively eviscerates this
traditional rationale for the existence of the representative capacity
doctrine.
b.

Protection of an Individual's Personal Privacy

The second major purpose behind the representative capacity doctrine is to limit the fifth amendment to the protection of an individual's
privacy.2 28 Therefore, the contents of a collective entity's records were
never privileged because neither the entity nor the custodian had a privacy interest substantial enough to invoke the fifth amendment. 22 9 The
Fisher Court, however, seemingly divorced the fifth amendment from
privacy concerns.23 0 Stating that the Court "cannot cut the Fifth
Amendment completely loose from the moorings of its language, and
make it serve as a general protector of privacy," the Court reasoned that
other amendments, particularly the fourth, serve as protectors of individual privacy. 23 1 Clearly, if the Court eliminated privacy concerns from
withhold the books to shield the custodian's own wrongdoing. Id. To circumvent this possibility, the Court went on to hold in Wilson, that
[a] command to the corporation is in effect a command to those who
are officially responsible for the conduct to its affairs. If they ...

pre-

vent compliance [with the subpoena] or fail to take appropriate action
within their power for the performance of the corporate duty, they, no
less than the corporation itself, are guilty of disobedience and may be
punished for contempt.
Id. In other words, the custodian can be held in contempt for preventing the
corporation from complying with the subpoena. The combination of the potential sanctions of imprisonment and fine are generally enough to ensure that a
custodian will acquiesce to a request to turn the books over to a representative
of the entity for ultimate delivery to the government.
227. Comment, supra note 76, at 1634 (recognition of custodian's privilege
would not undermine law enforcement because contents of records are not privileged and corporation must comply with subpoena); Note, supra note 37, at

1565 (because act of production not concerned with record's contents, entity's
custodian cannot prevent their disclosure by invoking doctrine).
228. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1973) (fifth amendment respects individual's personal privacy).
229. Id. at 92 (substantial claim of privacy cannot be maintained with respect to financial records of collective entity).
230. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 401 (fifth amendment protects against compelled
self-incrimination, not disclosure of private information).
231. Id. at 400. The Court stated that the framers of the Constitution addressed the protection of privacy in the fourth amendment. Id. Therefore, it is
unlikely that the fifth amendment also seeks to "achieve a general protection of
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the scope of fifth amendment protections, then the privacy rationale un2 32
derlying the representative capacity doctrine no longer has validity.
Because the Court has stripped the contents of business records of any
fifth amendment privilege, there is no need to determine whether the
2 33
custodian has a privacy interest in the documents.
In reality, however, the Court did not eliminate privacy protection
from the fifth amendment. Rather, the Court made explicit that a claim
2 34
of privacy is not sufficient by itself to invoke the fifth amendment.
However, the Court limited the applicability of the act of production
itself to situations in which a custodian's privacy interests have been
compromised. As a prerequisite to invoking the production privilege, a
custodian must assert a privacy interest in the act of production. Consequently, the privacy rationale underlying the representative capacity
doctrine is satisfied when an individual meets the requirements needed
to invoke the act of production privilege.
Traditionally, in the representative capacity doctrine, a custodian
had to assert a substantial privacy interest in the records in order to
invoke the fifth amendment. 2 35 In order to implicate a custodian's personal privacy interest, the government had to intrude upon an individ'2 36
ual's "private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought."
Therefore, in order to invoke the fifth amendment, the government
must intrude upon the custodian's feelings and thought to extract selfcondemnation. 23 7 In Fisher, however, the Court held that an individual
must show that the compelled act is a testimonial one in order to invoke
the act of production doctrine. As previously discussed, a testimonial
act is one which forces the accused to "disclose the contents of his own
mind."' 23 8 To compel an individual to disclose the contents of his own
mind necessarily involves a governmental intrusion into his inner sanctum of feeling and thought. In other words, governmental compulsion
of a testimonial communication implicates an individual's personal privacy. 2 39 Therefore, in requiring a testimonial communication in order
to invoke the act of production doctrine, the Court has limited the fifth
privacy." Id. Instead, the fifth amendment only deals with the issue of compelled self-incrimination. Id.
232. See Note, supra note 37, at 1563 (no longer any need to distinguish
between private and business documents).
233. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 400.
234. Id. The Court held that private information is protected so long as it
involves compulsion of self-incriminating testimony. Id.
235. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. at 85, 91-92 (1973) (custodian
must have privacy interest in entity's records to invoke the fifth amendment).
236. Id. at 91.
237. Id. (fifth amendment proscribes state intrusion into individual's private enclave to extract self-condemnation).
238. Doe v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2341, 2348 (1988) (quoting Curcio v.
United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)). For a discussion of testimonial acts,
see supra notes 121-36 and accompanying text.
239. See Comment, supra note 76, at 1657 (testimonial admissions implicit
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amendment to protection of an individual's personal privacy and, as a
result, the second purpose of the representative capacity doctrine has
been satisfied.
Because the act of production doctrine advances the purposes underlying the representative capacity doctrine, the latter doctrine no
longer has a compelling rationale to exist. Filling this fifth amendment
void is the newly developed act of production doctrine. Although an
entity cannot invoke the act of production privilege itself,240 a custodian
should be able to avail himself of the privilege. If the custodian is successful in raising a fifth amendment claim, the entity is still bound to
produce its records. Because the custodian's claim relates only to the act
of production, any information derived from the contents of the records
is available for use against the custodian.
2.

The Residual Problems of a Custodian's Claim

Although the primary purposes justifying the representative capacity doctrine have been eliminated by the act of production analysis, the
Court pointed out another problem posed by recognizing a custodian's
act of production claim. Specifically, the Court was concerned that the
extension of the act of production analysis to collective entity custodians
would make the government's task of prosecuting both the entity and
custodian more difficult. 2 4 1 If the custodian is excused from producing

the records, the collective entity will have to appoint another custodian
to deliver the documents to the government. 24 2 However, this substitute custodian may not have the former custodian's knowledge of the
records and probably will not receive any aid from the former custodian
in responding to the subpoena. 24 3 This solution does not ensure that
all the required books will reach the grand jury. 2 44 Consequently, prosecution of economic crimes will become more difficult, although not
impossible.
To alleviate this problem, the government could grant the custoin act of production are private even though custodian is acting in representative
capacity).
240. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2288. For a discussion of why a collective entity
cannot invoke the fifth amendment, see supra notes 44-55 and accompanying
text.
241. 108 S. Ct. at 2294 (recognizing custodian's privilege would have detrimental impact on prosecution of white collar crime).
242. Id. (corporation must appoint substitute custodian in order to comply
with subpoena).
243. Id. Any statement by the original custodian to the substitute custodian
about the records would also disclose the contents of the original custodian's
mind and would, therefore, be testimonial. Id. As a result, the government
could not compel the custodian to provide incriminating information to the substitute custodian.
244. Id. (appointment of surrogate custodian will not ensure that documents sought will reach grand jury).
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dian use immunity with respect to the act of production. 24 5 As a result,
the government could not use any evidence derived from this act against
2 47
the custodian, 24 6 although it could use the contents of the records.
The Court, however, viewed this situation as increasing the government's burden in prosecuting the custodian. Because the government
must prove it did not obtain any evidence introduced against the custodian as a result of the act of production, 248 the Court felt that often
relevant information could be withheld from the government due to the
24 9
government's failure to meet this burden.
The mere presence of the fifth amendment, however, leads to difficulties in prosecuting crime. Frequently, the fifth amendment denies
the government important information. However, this result was antici250
pated, even intended, when the fifth amendment was promulgated.
Although the fifth amendment often creates difficulties for the government in prosecution, such difficulties should not be considered when
251
determining the applicability of the fifth amendment.
245. Id. The custodian would then have to produce the subpoenaed
records. However, the government could not use any incriminating evidence

obtained directly or indirectly from the act of production against the custodian.
For a discussion of the consequences of granting use immunity, see supra note
106.
246. Id. at 2295 (government cannot use evidence it obtains under use immunity either directly or derivatively against custodian).
247. The government's grant of immunity would extend only to the act of
production, and not to the records themselves. See id. at 2295 n.10. Conceivably, however, the government could grant the custodian transactional immunity,
which would preclude prosecution for the offense under investigation. For a
discussion of transactional immunity, see supra note 106. However, because the
more limited use immunity is sufficient to overcome a custodian's fifth amendment privilege, it is unlikely that the government would extend transactional
immunity solely for the production of the records.
248. For a discussion of immunity and the government's evidentiary burden, see supra note 106.
249. 108 S. Ct. at 2295 (government's inability to meet burden may result
in exclusion of legitimately obtained evidence).
250.
Our forefathers, when they wrote ... the Fifth Amendment...
made a judgment and expressed it in our fundamental law, that it were
better for an occasional crime to go unpunished than that the prosecution should be free to build up a criminal case ... with the assistance of
enforced disclosures by the accused ....
Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 (1956) (quoting Maffie v. United
States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954)).
251. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 127 (1957). In Curcio the gov-

ernment argued that compulsion of custodians' testimony concerning the
whereabouts of entity records would result in greater ease in obtaining the
records. Id. However, the Court refused to balance the government's ease
against the custodians' rights. Id. Curcio's valid fifth amendment claim outweighed any considerations concerning the government's convenience. Id. See
also In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 529 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(allowing compulsion of act of production would be great convenience to government, but until fifth amendment is repealed, government must live with rule
that custodian cannot be compelled to disclose contents of his mind).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss2/5

36

Price: Braswell v. United States: An Examination of a Custodian's Fifth
1989]

NOTE

389

Although the fifth amendment sometimes works to save culpable
persons from punishment, it was "aimed at . . . more far-reaching
evil[s]." 2 52 These evils include the prevention of physical or moral compulsion to extort information from the accused. 25 3 Also, the fifth
amendment preserves our accusatorial system of criminal justice by forcing the government to produce its own evidence against an accused
rather than obtaining it "by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it
from his own mouth." '25 4 Moreover, it recognizes an individual's right
to a "private enclave where he may lead a private life."'2 55 The recognition of a custodians' privilege often makes prosecution more difficult.
However, this is not a rationale compelling enough to deny a privilege
to the custodian in light of the history and purpose of the fifth
amendment.
Furthermore, because most prosecutions against custodians will be
based upon the contents of the records, the Court exaggerates the potential dangers to the prosecution of white-collar crime. 2 56 None of the
information contained in the records themselves will be denied to the
government. 25 7 Policy reasons notwithstanding, if the government cannot successfully prosecute the custodian by using the information contained in the records, it should not be allowed to strengthen its case
through use of the legal process to compel other incriminating evidence
from the custodian.
B.

The Limitation on the Scope of the Representative Capacity Doctrine

Although the Court held that the representative capacity doctrine
had continued vitality, that determination is not dispositive of whether a
252. Ullman, 350 U.S. at 428.
253. Id.
254. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (citing Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-38 (1940)).
255. Id. (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 579, 581-82
(2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
256. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
asserts that the Court's concerns are overstated for several reasons. First, even
if custodians are granted this privilege, it is not at all certain that it will exist in
many cases. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Whether the act of production involves testimonial self-incrimination is a factual issue decided in each case.
Moreover, where the testimonial communications of the act of production are
foregone conclusions, the act of production privilege does not apply. Id. (Kennedy,J., dissenting). Second, he argued that even in the event of a successful act
of production claim, the government can grant the custodian use immunity
"without impeding the investigation." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Because
the contents of the records are not privileged, the immunity would extend exclusively to evidence obtained as a result of production of the documents. The
government "would be free to use the contents of the records against everyone,
and it would be free to use any testimonial act implicit in production against all
but the custodian .... " Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
257. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (government is free to use contents of
records against everyone, including custodian).
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custodian may invoke the act of production doctrine. It is submitted
that the representative capacity doctrine does not preclude a custodian
from invoking the act of production doctrine. Contrary to the Court's
holding, the representative capacity doctrine's scope does not comprehend preclusion of the act of production doctrine. Instead, the scope of
the representative capacity doctrine is limited to the prevention of fifth
amendment claims in the contents of business records. Thus, if a custodian asserts a valid fifth amendment claim concerning subject matter
other than the contents of the subpoenaed records, the representative
capacity doctrine is inapplicable. Therefore, because Braswell asserted
a fifth amendment claim based upon the act of production and not the
contents of the entity's records, the representative capacity doctrine
does not prevent judicial recognition of his claim.
To reach its conclusion in Braswell, the Court held that the scope of
the representative capacity doctrine is determined by the individual's
status as custodian. 2 58 Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the custodian's compelled act is performed in a 'representative capacity. 25 9 If the
act is performed in a representative capacity, it is imputed to the entity. 260 Therefore, any privilege claimed in relation to these acts "would
be tantamount to a claim of privilege by the corporation-which of
26 1
course possesses no such privilege."
It is submitted that the Court's approach to the scope of the representative capacity doctrine is flawed. In the representative capacity
cases, the custodian was denied a privilege because he could not assert
the required elements necessary to make out a valid fifth amendment
claim. 262 However, it was not the individual's status as a custodian
which denied him the ability to assert the required interest. Instead, it
was the subject matter of his claim which prevented him from invoking
the fifth amendment. That is, the nature of the subpoenaed documents
as collective entities' records was the dispositive factor, not the individual's status as a custodian. 263 Therefore, the scope of the representative
258. Id. at 2291 (assumption of representative capacity leads to certain obligations which include duty to produce records).
259. Id. (acts performed in representative capacity are deemed act of entity;
any claim of fifth amendment privilege asserted by custodian would be claim of
privilege by entity).
260. Id.(acts performed in representative capacity are deemed act of
entity).
261. Id.
262. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1973) (custodian could not
assert privacy interest necessary to invoke fifth amendment); United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694, 699-700 (1943) (same); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361, 378 (1911) (custodian could not assert ownership interest in records).
263. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 80 (1913). In Grant, the attorney
of a stockholder of a dissolved corporation refused to produce subpoenaed
records, claiming they were his client's personal property. Id. at 77. The
Court's inquiry into whether the attorney or the client could refuse to produce

the records sheds light on the scope of the representative capacity doctrine. Be-
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capacity doctrine is properly delineated by determining the subject matter of the fifth amendment claim and not by inquiring into whether the
compelled act was performed in a representative capacity. If the subject
matter of a valid fifth amendment claim is not the contents of the subpoenaed records, the representative capacity doctrine is inapplicable
and, thus, does not preclude recognition of the asserted privilege.
This conclusion is illustrated in Curcio v. United States. 2 64 In Curcio,

the custodian asserted a fifth amendment claim relating to the attempted
compulsion of his testimony concerning the location of subpoenaed
records. 2 65 Although the testimony related to the entity's records, the
Court held that Curcio could not be compelled to testify. 26 6 The gov-

ernment argued, however, that Curcio was not entitled to a fifth amendment privilege. 26 7 Because the testimony would be given in his
representative capacity, the government argued that Curcio deserved no
privilege. 2 68 In response, the Court replied that the fifth amendment
does not contain an exception for testimony given in a representative
capacity. 2 69 Thus, the Court's inquiry ended when it determined that
2 70
Curcio had asserted a valid fifth amendment claim.
The implication of Curcio is clear. Because Curcio did not assert a
privilege in the record's contents, the representative capacity doctrine
did not prevent recognition of his fifth amendment rights. Further, the
Curcio Court elaborated on why the representative capacity doctrine prevents a privilege in the records: "[B]ecause [the custodian] does not
own the records and has no legally cognizable interest in them," he cancause the subpoenaed papers were corporate records, the Court held that they
could not be withheld. Id. at 80. Even though title to the records had passed to
the stockholder, "their essential character was not changed. " Id. (emphasis added).

The Court was even more explicit in Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478
(1913). In Wheeler, the Court held that dissolution of a corporation did not permit a custodian to make out a valid claim. Id. at 490. "It was the character of the
books and papers as corporate records and documents which justified . . . their

production." Id. Clearly, the Court, even in these predecessors to the representative capacity doctrine, was concerned with the nature of the documents and
not the individual's status. The subsequent development of the representative
capacity doctrine supports this conclusion. In Wilson, the custodian could not
assert an ownership interest in the records. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 378. However,
Wilson's status as custodian did not deprive him of an ownership interest. Instead, the nature of the documents as corporate documents precluded Wilson
from asserting an ownership interest. In both Bellis and White the custodian
could not make out a privacy interest in the records. Again, this was not because
of their status as custodian, but because the records themselves could not support such an interest. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 92; White, 322 U.S. at 699-700.
264. 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
265. Id. at 119.
266. Id. at 128.
267. Id. at 123.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 123-24.
270. Id.
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not invoke the fifth amendment. 27 1 Thus, the Curcio Court recognized
that the scope of the representative capacity doctrine is determined by
the nature of the records and not the individual's status. The Braswell
Court, however, incorrectly characterized Curcio as creating an exception
to the representative capacity doctrine for oral testimony. 2 72 In treating
Curcio as an exception for oral testimony, it is submitted that the Court
misapprehended the focus of Curcio for two reasons.
First, in treating Curcio as an exception to the representative capacity doctrine, the Court necessarily assumes that the doctrine deprives
custodians of their fifth amendment privilege when acting in a representative capacity. 27 3 As previously discussed, the history of the representative capacity doctrine demonstrates that the Court was not concerned
with the custodian's general fifth amendment rights. Instead, the Court
focused on the custodian's fifth amendment rights in the contents of
business records. 2 74 Because the Court found that a custodian did not
have a fifth amendment claim in the contents of an entity's records, it
never reached the issue of whether the representative capacity doctrine
overrode a valid fifth amendment claim until Curcio. In Curcio, the Court
held that a valid claim of privilege is not precluded by the representative
capacity doctrine. Therefore, in treating Curcio as an exception to the
representative capacity doctrine the Court incorrectly broadens the
scope of the doctrine.
Second, the Curcio Court did not intend to limit its holding to only
oral testimony. The Court did not reach the decision in Curcio because it
felt that one mode of communication was more incriminating than another. Rather, the custodian's testimony was privileged because it
would "disclose the contents of ... [the custodian's] mind." 2 75 As a
result of this intrusion into Curcio's mind, he made a valid fifth amendment claim which the representative capacity doctrine could not override. Because Braswell made out a fifth amendment claim which was not
based upon the contents of the entity's records, the representative capacity precedents allow recognition of his claim. However, after rejecting these arguments and holding that Braswell cannot assert a fifth
amendment claim because of his status as custodian, the Court then restricted the government's use of Braswell's act of production.
271. Id. at 128.
272. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2293 (Curcio Court made clear that line was
drawn between oral testimony and other forms of incriminating testimony).
273. In fact, the Court was more explicit. The Court stated that "[t]he
plain mandate of [the representative capacity cases] is that ... the individual in
his capacity as a custodian ... may not resist a subpoena for corporate records
on Fifth Amendment grounds." Id. at 2290.
274. For a discussion of the history of the scope of the representative capacity doctrine, see supra notes 66-91 and accompanying text.
275. 108 S. Ct. at 2290.
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The Evidentiary Use Restriction

After analyzing Braswell's fifth amendment claim and concluding
that the representative capacity corollary to the collective entity doctrine
precludes a custodian from invoking the act of production doctrine, the
Court then restricted the government's use of information obtained as a
result of production. 27 6 Although this limitation provides some measure of protection to a custodian, it is neither a logical result of the
Court's holding nor a satisfactory substitute for the fifth amendment.
The Court rationalizes the limitation placed on the government by
stating that the custodian holds the records in his representative capacity. 27 7 Therefore, the production of the records is performed in his representative capacity as well. Consequently, the act is deemed one of the
2 78
Direct use of this act by the govcorporation and not the individual.
ernment as evidence against the custodian is impermissible because it is
the corporation's act of production rather than that of the custodian.
However, the corporation's act of production may be used against the
custodian. 279 This analysis is similar to that adopted by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in In Re GrandJury Proceedings (Morganstern).280 In Morganstern, however, the court held that the act
of production is not a testimonial act when done in a representative capacity. 28 ' Thus, the act of production doctrine is not available because
the custodian cannot meet the Doe requirements for a fifth amendment
claim.2 8 2 However, if the government then attempted to introduce evidence of the act of production against the custodian, "[s]uch proof
would seek to add testimonial value to the otherwise testimony-free act
of production." ' 2 83 Once the government added testimonial value to the
act of production, the custodian could meet the Doe requirements and
presumably invoke the fifth amendment to exclude the evidence.
In Braswell, however, the Court recognized that the act of produc276. Id. at 2295 (government can make no evidentiary use of custodian's
act of production against custodian individually). For a discussion of this use
restriction, see supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
277. 108 S. Ct. at 2291 (Court has consistently recognized that custodian of
entity records holds those documents in representative capacity).
278. Id.
279. Id. In other words, the government cannot introduce evidence that
the custodian produced the subpoenaed records. This would be using the custodian's individual act against him. Instead, the government may introduce evidence that the corporation produced its records in response to the subpoena.
Id. Also, the government may establish the custodian's position in the corporation and allow the jury to infer that he had possession of the records and produced them himself. Id. In essence, the government cannot make explicit the
nexus between the custodian and the production of the records. Id.
280. 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985).
281. Id. at 147-48.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 148 (quoting In re Grand Jury Empanelled, 722 F.2d 294, 297
(6th Cir. 1983)).
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tion is testimonial even when undertaken in a representative capacity."8 4
It is solely the individual's status as custodian which prevents invocation
of the fifth amendment. The significance of the distinction between the
Morganstern and Braswell approaches is that under Braswell the government may introduce evidence obtained as a result of the act of production in the custodian's trial whereas under Morganstern it could not.
Although the nexus between the evidence and the custodian is left for
the jury to determine, if the jury infers such a nexus, the custodian has
been compelled to provide testimonial, incriminating evidence that
could help convict him. Because of the vaguely defined boundaries of
this evidentiary use restriction, it is impossible to tell just how much the
government must leave up to the jury's imagination and powers of deduction. Therefore, the inference of a connection between the custodian and the production of the records often may not be difficult to
make. 28 5 However, whether difficult to make or not, it is undeniable
that the government compelled the custodian to provide incriminating
evidence used at his own trial.
Furthermore, the fact that the Court developed the evidentiary use
limitation at all detracts from its holding that a custodian is not entitled
to a fifth amendment privilege. The use limitation will often work to
withhold relevant information from the jury, but the source of the
28 6
Court's authority to create such a limitation remains undivulged.
Logically, the Court cannot invoke the fifth amendment to limit the government's use of the information. To do so would be to admit that a
custodian's act of production implicates the fifth amendment. 28 7 However, "there are no grounds ... for declaring the information inadmissible, unless it be the Fifth Amendment. '2 88 The absence of an
alternative ground to create such a limitation weakens the Court's assertion that a custodian is not entitled to a fifth amendment privilege. This
evidentiary limitation implies that use of the evidence has been wrong284. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2288.
285. Braswell presented a case where the inference of the nexus between the
act of production and Braswell's participation is not difficult for the jury to

make. The prosecution can point out to the jury that although Braswell's wife
and mother were officers of the corporations, they had little or no actual author-

ity. Braswell was responsible for the operations of the corporations. Therefore,
Braswell was the only officer in charge of the day-to-day operations of the corporations. The implication that Braswell possessed the books and was responsible
for their production is clear. Indeed, the smaller the size of the entity, the easier

it is for the government to link the custodian to the act of production.
286. Id. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Court's source of authority to
create such exception "remains unexplained").
287. Id. at 2296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (creation of use restriction "admits what the Court denied in the first place, namely that compelled compliance
with the subpoena implicates the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
privilege").
288. Id. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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fully obtained, but the Court went to great pains to demonstrate that the
collection of the evidence by the government was permissible.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Note submits that the Braswell Court incorrectly denied a custodian a fifth amendment privilege in producing subpoenaed records of
a corporation. This conclusion stands on two separate rationales. First,
the act of production doctrine satisfies the underlying policies of the
representative capacity doctrine. Because recognition of a custodian's
assertion of the act of production analysis does not confer a derivative
fifth amendment privilege on the collective entity, and because a custodian has a substantial privacy interest in the act of production, the policies supporting the representative capacity doctrine have been washed
away. Without these policies, the representative capacity doctrine loses
its justification for continued existence. Therefore, there is no bar to
the recognition of a custodian's act of production analysis claim.
Second, and more importantly, the representative capacity doctrine
itself does not preclude recognition of a custodian's act of production
analysis claim. Therefore, even if the representative capacity doctrine
has continued validity, it does not bar a~custodian's act of production
claim. In developing the representative capacity doctrine, the Court
limited its scope to the prevention of fifth amendment claims in the contents of the business records. Therefore, if a custodian asserts a valid
fifth amendment claim based upon something other than the contents of
the subpoenaed records, the representative capacity doctrine is inapplicable. Consequently, an act of production analysis claim, because it is
not based upon the contents of the records, is not barred by the representative capacity doctrine.
Although the Court limited the government's use of the act of production against the custodian, this restriction does not afford protection
coextensive with that of the fifth amendment and is not a logical result
of the Court's denial of a privilege. In sum, it is submitted that the
Court's resolution of the issue of whether a collective entity's custodian
can invoke the act of production analysis is incorrect because the Court
adequately addressed neither the scope of nor the justifications for the
representative capacity doctrine.
Scott D. Price
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